

FROM CLANS TO COLONIALS TO CONTEMPORARY TIMES: THE SHIFTING DYNAMICS OF SOMALI SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL LIFE

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ABSTRACT

Community transformation has been vital throughout human existence. It deals with community alterations of lifestyle in a new direction. Likewise, Somali communities have been experiencing strings of transformations throughout their lifespan. This transformation starts with Somali communities' first immigration to the current life experience. Therefore, this article attempts to briefly note down the significant transformation of Somali communities during pre and postcolonial periods. The article employs historical analysis as the methodology which facilitates understanding the complex process of change and continuity over time. The article argues that the significant transformations in the pre-colonial period include shaping and forming imagined clans based on genealogy and contract, their traditional system of law, and the formation of faith-based imagined Sufi communities. The article also argues the significant transformation of Somali communities, including the economic transformation from family-based production to a capitalist production system. It also highlights the alteration of the traditional public law system to the Indian Penal Law and the Indian Code of Civil Procedure which was never applicable and transparent to the Somali communities. Finally, it argues that Somali communities transformed into having discrete beyond-border identities in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somaliland as the consequences of colonial jurisdiction.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The act of completely changing something into something else is referred to as community transformation. It is a shift in the shape or organization of a community. For millennia, Somali communities have been changing. Henceforth, the origin of Somali communities has contested narratives among Somali studies. A significant argument claims Arab origin in the Somali genealogy—which seems an imagination as many shreds of evidence disproves that claim. The second narrative relates to the Somali genealogy belonging to the Cushitic speaking ethnicities (Afar, Saho and Oromo) in the Horn of Africa. Whatever the Somali origin is, communities have been transforming through centuries which began with the first migration of the Somali communities. The Somali communities comprised four groups—hunters, pastoralists, farmers and preachers and traders united by locality mixed and formed imagined communities—clans. However, clans are made up of people of common lineage; still, it is imaginary, according to Ibn Khaldun (1999). A clan is imaginary because the clan members may not meet face to face forever since they have a boundary limiting the clans' territory. The clans structured, created their traditional ruling system and leadership before the colonials. Although kinship and clan

contract was the bond that holds Somali communities together, another worth mentioning bond was faith-based—Sufism. The arrival and spread of Islam among the Somali communities altered their lives from clannism into faith-based Sufi sects, which impacted their lives.

Before the colonials, the economic structure of the Somali communities depended on the family, which was the primary production unit. Families had the independence for the utilization of their production. However, this mode of production changed during the colonials, which facilitated the alienation of the Somali communities from their production. Another major transformation happened to the traditional general rules system. The Somalis had standard traditional public rules, which were almost the same. The system was comprehensive and used to cover the need for law, customs and so on. Unfortunately, the colonials ignored and dismissed the traditional general rules system by replacing their colonial rule of law that did not apply to the communities. The colonial administration system was not transparent, fair and even written in a foreign language Somalis could never understand; even the western trained Somalis were not allowed to participate in the administrations' trials.

Moreover, the consequence of Somali communities' partition beyond several borders transformed the Somali communities forever by creating new geopolitics. The formed geopolitics paved the way for new borders, law, identity and taxation. The jurisdiction created a divisive identity among the Somalis—Somali Ethiopian, Somali British, Somali French (Djibouti) and Somali Kenyan, which also caused disputed borders in East Africa. Thus, it seems crucial to understand how Somali communities have been transforming throughout their history.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

The article applied historical analysis to its primary methodological approach, understanding that the transformation of Somali communities has occurred over centuries and has been impacted by a multitude of factors. Historical analysis helps us “reconstruct the past” and “understand the complex process of change and continuity over time” (Green & Troup, 1999, p. 1).

Complementing this methodology is an engagement with relevant secondary sources. These sources are scholarly interpretations and analyses of primary or secondary sources (Marwick, 2001). The article critically evaluated a range of academic articles and books related to Somali history, colonialism, and social transformation, positioning our research within existing scholarly conversations.

The article's analysis is organized chronologically, tracing the transformation of Somali communities from pre-colonial times to the present. This structure highlights patterns, continuities, and changes within different periods (Jordanova, 2006). The article also prioritized contextualization, situating specific events and transformations within larger global, regional, and local contexts. This approach helps illuminate Somali communities' unique and shared experiences over time (Howell & Prevenier, 2001).

2.1 The Debate about the Somali Origin

Contradictory debates about Somali origin and their primitive settlement are essential among Somali studies. Despite various debates about Somali origin, there are two leading debates about Somali origin—the Arab lineage and the Cushitic family membership. The first debate insists that Somalis have Arab origin. This imagined claim is based on the long-term Arab-Somali relations since the beginning of the Somali people's history, indeed to their pre-history (Hersi, 1977, p. 302). As Hersi (1977), contended that the partnerships founded in ancient and classical times contributed to the formation of many other linkages that grew in interconnectedness and intensity till they ultimately resulted in the current common ground of Arab-Somali global economic, political, and cultural interests, as evidenced by the Somali Democratic Republic's membership in the League of Arab States. The creation of such an imagined community facilitated the claim that some Somali clans have an ancestry link to Prophet Mohammed's agnates, the Quraish. The Somali imagination about Arabness created an empty proudness over the other Africans as Eno (2008), said: "In the mind of the Somali nomad of that time, Arabness was superior compared to the African identity in his neighborhood" (Eno, 2008, p. 287).

However, Hersi (1977) argued that Somali preference for Arabness is based on grievance and political interests. The colonials arrived and divided the Somalis into five regions—Southern Somalis (Somalia) for Italy, Northern Somalis (Somaliland) for Britain, Djibouti for French, Western Somalis (Ogadenia) for Ethiopian Empire, and Northern Front District (NFD) for Britain, which later became part of Kenya. During the departure of the colonial, Somalis insisted on uniting and creating a nation-state that all Somalis would cherish. Most Africans opposed the Somalis' struggle for national reunification. The African hostility to what they considered a just cause increasingly estranged the Somalis emotionally and politically from Africa and forced them to seek closer association with the Arab world (Hersi, 1977, p. 304). Somalis' seeking support from their imagined fellow Arabs does not represent that all Somalis are satisfied with the claim of Arab lineage. Hersi (1977), mentioned "For strange as it may sound, and despite the universal currency of these claims, the Somalis do not consider themselves as Arabs ethnically or even culturally" (Hersi, 1977).

Mansuur (2016), studied the Somali genealogy and organized it into three layers. The first is the top layer which contains all Arabic or Islamic names from the name of one's ancestor (such as Sheikh Ismail Jabarti (Darood), Sheikh Ishaq (Dir), Fiqi Omar (Hawiye), Omar Diini (Digil), etc.) until it ends with the name of the Quraysh (such as Aqil, Ali Abi Talib, Abubakar Siddiq, etc.). These names usually represent ten generations. The second is the middle layer commences from descent to dozens of nouns, consisting of nouns associated with Arabic nouns, whose meaning in Somali is not even understood. The names of this species do not exceed 10 to 12 generations. The last is the lower layer which starts from the living person to over twenty counts until the middle part. These names consist of Arab or Muslim names like (Mohammed Ali). The meaning of these is identifiable, which indicates a person's character or period born (such as Ayaanle, Bulxan, Liban, Ghedi, etc. (Mansuur, 2016, p. 246). Thus, counting the Somali genealogy from the living generation to the last shows contradictory trends that emphasize the imagination that Somalis have Arab ancestry.

On the other hand, the second debate based on anthropological studies shows that Somalis belong to the Cushitic-speaking family (Chrysochoou, 2003; Ehret, 1974; Elmi, 2010; Eno & Kusow, 2014; Grottanelli, 1972; Hersi, 1977; Jama, 2007; Kusow, 2004; H. S. Lewis, 1966; I

M Lewis, 1980; Ioan Myrddin Lewis, 2017; Mansuur, 2016; Oliver & Fage, 1963; Abdi Ismail Samatar, 2006; Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016). They are ethnically, linguistically, and culturally related to the Cushitic-speaking family. This includes the nearby Afar of Djibouti, Eritrea, and the Awash Valley, as well as the Ethiopian and Northern Kenyan Oromo and Borana Galla (I M Lewis, 1993, p. 9).

Most of the Cushitic people, especially the Somali, Afar, and Saho, have traditions of common origin in the North-West corner of the Horn of Africa. They exhibit what is basically a common culture that belongs to the Galla and Beja. Lewis (2017), argued that the Cushitic people, more specifically the Somali, Afar, and Saho, belong to one language family group, common belief—the Mohammedan (Sufism), have an extreme individualistic behavior and segmentary political structure, and they all have a tribal chief representative figure with power limitations. To understand the origin of ethnicities, it is crucial to investigate the ancient locations of the people. Therefore, the anthropologists, historians, and archeologists studied where these Cushitic people, including the Somalis, initially settled, and emigrated. They chronologically arranged their movement into three periods: The first migration was the Ham ancestors. The Hamitic people, including the Barber, Ancient Egyptian, and Cushitic, lived about 10,000 years ago in the Caucasus Mountains, especially in northern Iran (Grottanelli, 1972; Oliver & Fage, 1963). Other scholars believe that the Hamitic's original settlement was in Mesopotamia. With their livestock (cattle and sheep), these people passed through Sinai and then stopped in Egypt. After a while, the Egyptians remained in the area, and the other two groups continued their journey. Next, Berbers migrated further west, and their lineage expanded into Northwestern Africa. Finally, the Cushitic moved east, stopping between the Red Sea and Nile Valley and extending into the Horn of Africa.

The Second Journey was the ancestors of the Cushitic people. When comparisons are made, considering their dispersal, the Cushitic languages appear that the people who speak those languages used to be a single language group formerly living in the Sudanese and Eritria border. In time, these people began migrating from the area to the southeast until it reached the lake area, the highlands of southern Ethiopia. Groups left behind the Cushitic people during the migration. Each group grew until it became a multicultural society. Beja was the group that remained in its former home, and it is still there today and is called the Northern Cushites. The Agaw group remained in Eritrea-Ethiopia. Those who arrived at the lake site were divided into two groups. Part of it continued southwards to northern Tanzania and was named South Cushite. The other part of the so-called Eastern Cushites was further divided into Oromo, Sidamo, Saho (Afar), Somali, etc.

The third journey was the Somali Muslim ancestors. Somalis have spread to the edge of the Horn of Africa, where people came from the South of the Arabian Peninsula and other countries used to arrive. These migrants and indigenous Somalis had gradually gathered and mixed. The merger began in the pre-Islamic era in the coastal areas, mainly in the north. As Islam spread, the integration intensified, and a third migration began, moving southwest and south (Mansuur, 2016). Finally, the voyage was made inland to the Somali coast, where many pastoralists have remained and are still living.

3.0 PRE-COLONIAL SOMALI COMMUNITY TRANSFORMATION

3.1 The Formation of Imagined Clan Communities

After the long migration of Cushitic people, including Somalis, to the Horn of Africa and the Somali expansion to the south, Somalis underwent a significant transformation. The social structure of Somali communities has been established. Grottanelli (1972), documented that the origin of the Somali community was divided into four groups with various professions and arrived in the country at a different time, and most groups merged. The Somali communities contained the four groups: the Hunters, originally from the Ham ancestor who followed their livestock, were the first people to reach the Horn of Africa. The second group that arrived in the Horn of Africa were herders of Cushitic origins looking for pasture and water for their livestock and gradually expanding in Africa's Horn. The third group were Bantu farmers from the south and broadened the riversides. Moreover, the final groups were traders and preachers from South Asia (mainly the Arabian Peninsula) settled on the shores of the Horn of Africa and established coastal cities in the Horn of Africa and beyond.

The formation of the Somali social structure is due to the integration and unification of several factors, including; the constant migration to the south, camel farming and nomadism, exogamy, and the Somali language's commonality (Mansuur, 2016, p. 199). Thus, the consequence of the Somali social structure formation ignited a new community organization—the clan. However, many people believe that a clan is made up of people or small communities that belong to the same lineage; unfortunately, as Ibn Khaldun argued, the clan is also imaginary. Various clans' unification led to the foundation of the current Somali nation. In addition to Ibn Khaldun, Anderson (1991), argues that the nations are also imagined political communities. It is imagined as inherently limited and sovereign at the same time. Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political community—and imagined as both characteristically limited and sovereign.” A nation, like any community bigger than a small village, is “imagined” since most people will never see one another face to face but view themselves as belonging to a “political community” that is like a family, with common origins, mutual interests, and “profound, parallel solidarity.”

The same concept can be applied to the Somali clans who do not share a common ancestry but imagined. Hence, as Mansuur documented, “given the genealogy of Somali clans, it is clear that this is not entirely true (Mansuur, 2016, p. 219). Most Somali clans live beyond borders in various countries in the Horn of Africa—Somaliland, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. It is unlikely that these clans would meet one-on-one but still regard themselves to the specific clan. Accordingly, literature shows that the common cause of the Somali clan formation is dialectical—kinship and contract rather than common ancestry (Grottanelli, 1972; Hersi, 1977; Hinds, 2013; Kapteijns, 2002; I M Lewis, 1993; Mansuur, 2016; Mohamed, 2007; Oliver & Fage, 1963).

The establishment of the Somali clan is motivated by several factors, including the pastoralist nature, always searching for water and pasture and conflicts between different groups. The fundamental motive of forming a clan was to find security for their lives and livestock and simplify living through collaboration. Ibn Khaldun believed that humans have dual nature: human nature and animal nature. Human nature is the source of calmness, honesty, and other good qualities. In contrast, animal nature causes humans to be animals by trying to take

anything that comes to their mind by any means (Ibn Khaldun, 1999, pp. 69, 641). The animal nature of human beings triggers conflicts and confrontations between the groups.

Humans are social creatures who possess two necessities. Firstly, individuals are not independent to acquire their needs and wants in life. Secondly, they need self-preservation and protection from other humans (Ibn Khaldun, 1999, p. 69). To attain protection, human needs to unite and alliance with others. The most basic cooperation occurs between silat al-al-raham (very close agnates – the dia-paying group). The relationship between blood relatives is natural to human beings To get protection, humans must band together and form alliances. The most fundamental form of collaboration is between silat al-al-raham (very close agnates–the dia-paying group). Human beings are born with an inherent affinity towards their blood kin (Ibn Khaldun, 1999, p. 225). Nasab connects closely related agnates (genealogy; the counting of fathers). When the nasab is 'very near,' the 'obvious outcome' is al-itihad and al-iltiham (closeness or togetherness). This is the basis for asabiya (group feeling; in Somali, tolnimo). Close agnates are connected by nasab (genealogy; the counting of fathers). When the nasab is 'very close,' then al-itihad and al-iltiham (closeness or togetherness) is the 'clear result' This is the foundation of asabiya (group feeling; in Somali, tolnimo). As Ibn Khaldun argued, the asabiya is the driving force of forming clans based on genealogy and contract. The two are dissimilar. The first is based on the genealogical relationship among the individuals. The second remains the genuine feeling that bonds individuals together as a clan, giving them the ability to protect themselves. In times of conflict, the asabiya is extremely useful. War is a "natural phenomenon among human beings" since man is by nature wicked (Ibn Khaldun 1999: 479). The roots of war are retaliation, enmity, and a battle for wealth and influence; nevertheless, retaliation is the most prevalent cause (Ibn Khaldun 1999: 479). The Somali clans formed for the need to facilitate their lives and protect themselves from the common threats.

Agnates used different alliance mechanisms to offset the system's inequality (Mohamed, 2007a). "Some of these alliances were based on uterine connection, and some on pure invention." While affinal connections did not form part of lineage morphology, these were critical for lineage segmentation (Lewis 1961: 141), When one section of a primary lineage was weaker than another, Somalis formed baho (uterine alliances) to balance the strength of several other groups within the same lineage (Lewis 1961: 156), thus; real or putative uterine alliances are as much a feature of the Somali lineage system as agnatic segmentation' (Lewis 1961: 156). There were further alliances, such as the gaanshaanbuur (shield stacking), which was struck across agnation without this [uterine] rationale, and to a comparable degree without honor' (Lewis 1961: 156). Somalis also developed various forms of affiliation-based relationships, such as xidid (literally root) marriages spanning clans and lineage cleavages.

3.2 Formation of the Somali Traditional Leader System

Somali society has no tradition of a monarchical or religious system that governs various clans and territories. Traditional Somali society was fiercely republican (Mohamed, 2007). There had been no centralized authority or power run by a single or a group of men. Drake-Brockman once said, "Somalis, Bwana, they no good; each his own Sultan" (Drake-Brockman, 1912, p. 102). Despite 'each his sultan', Somalis used to have leaders, judicial and political institutions represented the public good. Even while some leaders wore impressive titles such as Sheikh, Ugaas, Garaad, or Sultan, they lacked coercive power. They possessed no more authority than


an elder (Lewis, 1999, p. 241). Even the prominent clan elders (Hawiye, Dir, Darod and Digil and Mirifle) did not have a traditional leader who ruled over the entire clan. However, his clan lineage ends in one generation of any kind (Mansuur, 2016, p. 209).

The transformation of the Somali society through the formation of traditional leaders is rooted in the merger between the Somalis and the Islamic rulers who ruled the Somali lands, especially the Adal rulers. This is evidenced by Mansour's (2016) argument that all traditional Somali titles are derived from the Adal sultanate, including sultan, imam, ugaas, malaaq and garaad. The genealogy of the first Somali traditional leaders with titles like a sultan, imam and garaad to the current leading traditional elders go back to 19th generations; this shows that it started in the 16th century when the Adal sultanate collapsed (Mansuur, 2016, p. 208). With the creation of the Somali traditional leadership system, it became necessary to appoint someone to lead the clan. Although each clan has its own set of rules for who should lead the community, Somali clans generally share the characteristics of a community leader. The clan's leadership is primarily hereditary and inherited. A small part of the clan has a remarkable legacy to choose from among the head of the family, given that person has good character, patience, and generosity (Mansuur, 2016, p. 214). In addition, in most Somali clans, the person who inherits the clan leadership is the eldest son, provided the necessary conditions and morality come first.

3.3 The Structure of Somali Clan Genealogy

Throughout the world, genealogy was a practice that many communities used to find out where they came from, who they were close to and who they were. This genealogical tradition has been widely used primarily in rural areas for personal identification. However, urbanization and global government have eliminated this practice, which has given a person a different identity than the tribe. With the formation of the Somali tribal system and many clans in the society, the clan genealogy system was established to know to whom they belonged. The genealogical issue has a strong influence among the Somalis. Although tribalism and genealogy had gone through various stages, especially when the military government of Siad Barre banned the declaration of clannism today, it is a recurring theme in Somali communities. Genealogy determines the political share of clans in senior positions in the Somali government, and the so-called 4.5 system determines what share each clan will get. The four (4) system represents the four major clans and the (0.5) point five for minorities. For instance, if the president comes from a clan, the prime minister, the speakers of upper and lower houses represent another clan; thus, it is no surprise if power competition commences among the government officials (Bade & Hared, 2021).

Several scholars have attempted to illustrate the general genealogical structure of Somali communities (Ali, 1993; Mansuur, 2016; Mohamed-Abdi, 1990; Muxamed, 2000). Several scholars have attempted to illustrate the general genealogical structure of Somali communities. They agree that Somalis are made up of eight significant clans and are splitting into smaller sub-clans, but it is not agreed that all sub-clans are descended from this model. In traditional Somali culture, since it is mainly oral, there is no standard diagram, and presumably, each person forms his mental picture (Luling, 2006b). Nevertheless, the Somali genealogy mainly lies as follows:



Source: (Mansuur, 2016, p. 239).

The above figure depicts the general Somali genealogy and contains two main branches Sab and Samaale, from Hiil (the mythical Somali Father). The Sab is the imagined Somali minority, whereas Samaale is the prominent Somali clan. The typical Somali does not go back further than his clan’s ancestor or, at most, his clan-family. Only the erudite or a few elders will be able to trace it back to the forefathers of the country's two major branches, Samaale and Sab, and their father Hiil, the alleged ancestor of the Somali people (Luling, 2006b). Thus, the lineage structure is imagined as Luling (2006) argued that “clans here are in theory each descended from one apical ancestor, and these ancestors are linked in the same genealogical scheme as those of the pastoral-nomadic clans” (Luling, 2006b).

3.4 Islam in Somalis and transformation of Somali Sufism

To understand the formation and transformation of Somali Sufism, it is crucial to understand the arrival and role of Islam in the Somali communities. Somalis are considered the earliest African people who accepted the Islamic religion (Bade, 2020b). Today, the Somalis are all Muslims, largely observing the Shafi’i Sunnite School of law (Hersi, 1977, p. 109). They are not only one of two civilizations in tropical Africa that are completely Islamized (the other being Zanzibar), but they also have one of the highest rates of Islamism anywhere in the globe (Hersi, 1977, p. 109). Islam as a religion and a set of beliefs pervades every element of Somali society to the point that it's impossible to conceive of the name Somali without indicating Islamic identity.

Some authorities maintain that Islam was introduced to the Zaila region of northern Somaliland in the early years of Muhammed's teaching by the Muslim escapes who sought refuge from Meccan attacks in Abyssinia (Jhazbhay, 2007). Additionally, Islam is unlikely to have penetrated Somaliland early after the Hejira, as Arab writers from the ninth and tenth centuries indicate (Ioan M Lewis, 1955). However, there is compelling evidence that Islam was present in Somalia as early as the first century of its existence. The idea of individual fanatics traveling to the Somali coast for missionary work in the early decades of Islam is not out of the realm of possibilities. The death of two women with Islamic names proves that Islam was present among the Somalis in the first century. Fatima Bint Cabd as-Samad Yacqub in A.H. 101 and Al-Hajiya bint Muhammed Muqaddam in A.H. 138 (Hersi, 1977, p. 109). The inscriptions on the tombstones of these two women came to be known through chance discoveries, and with proper archeological more and even older, a record of Islam's presence could be unearthed (Hersi, 1977, p. 109). Other accounts demonstrate that exiles from the Riddah (apostasy wars), primarily from Oman, settled in Benadir as early as 632 (Bade, 2020a). They eventually moved to the hinterlands via the Shabelle and Juba rivers, laying the groundwork for the early Islamic towns of Afgoye, Bali, Harar, and others (Mukhtar, 2003).

The Islamization transformed the Somali communities' way of life by adding a new layer—Sufism. The community transformed from clanship social construct to faith-based community from various clans to devote themselves for the sake of religion. It is evident that for the total social structure, the fraternities provide potential channels of alliance amongst warring tribes separated by the very nature of the tribe (Ioan M Lewis, 1955). For communities, economic and political entities as they may be, and sometimes at odds even within the same order, are joined together by a religious purpose together. They want to advance and spread Islam. Numerous scholars attribute the Prophet's message's success to economic, social, and political inequalities within Meccan society, which resulted in the emergence of a grassroots movement dedicated to overthrowing the Quraysh oligarchy and establishing a more equitable social system based on God's will. Following the Prophet's example, a sizable share of Islamic history's social reform initiatives have been led or inspired by religious practitioners (Ioan M Lewis, 1955). Sufis aimed massive community transformation for the Somalis and guided them through Prophet Mohammed's way of living. Since the faith's foundation in the early seventh century, social reform has been a defining feature. Many links the success of the Prophet's message to economic, social, and political inequalities within Meccan society that resulted in the emergence of a grassroots movement aimed at overthrowing the Quraysh oligarchy and replacing it with a more equitable social system based on the will of God. Following the Prophet's example, a large proportion of the social reform movements in Islamic history have been led or inspired by individuals drawn from the ranks of religious practitioners (Scott Steven Reese, 2008, p. 4).

Even though Somalis characterize a single Islamic sect (Sunni), there are various Islamic Dervish Orders (tariqa): Qadiriyyah, Ahmediyyah, Salihyyah, and Rifaiyyah are the most common. Qadiriyyah, founded by Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1077- 1166), the "most popular Islamic Saint", is the most popular order and found all over the Mohammedan Muslim world (Bade, 2020a). Harrar, Mogadishu, and Brava (Barawe) were the main centers that Qadiriyyah commenced to spread. Sharif Abu Bakr ibn 'Abd Allah al-'Aydarus (known as al-Qutb ar-Rabbani,' The Divine Axis'), who died in 1508-9, brought the Qadiriya, Islam's oldest Sufi

Order, into Harar in the 15th century (A.H.914). Abu Bakr is the most well-known Shafi'ite saint in southern Arabia, known as al-'Adani, and his mosque is the most familiar in Aden.

The Qadiriya had become the official Order of Harar, wielding considerable authority in the neighboring nation. To the south, the order does not appear to have gained any prominence in Somalia's interior until the early nineteenth century, when the hamlet of Bardera, locally known as Jamdha, was established on the Juba River (Ioan M Lewis, 1955). The Qadiriya seems to have a strong reputation for conservatism, is predominantly literary rather than propagandistic, and is believed to maintain a better quality of Islamic education than its competitors. By the early twentieth century, Qadiriyya's influence had spread as far south along the coast as Mozambique and as far interior as the modern Democratic Republic of Congo (S. Reese, 2009, p. 13). As per Reese (2009), the order's verbal and nonverbal histories attribute its establishment in East Africa towards the efforts of two Somali Shaykhs, Abd al-Rahman Zaylaci (c. 1820-1882) and Uways b. Muhammad (1847-1909). Zaylaci is recognized as the order's main reviver in Somalia. At the same time, Uways is remembered as its most fabulous publicist, extending the tariqa not just to Somalia's towns and countryside but even as far south as Zanzibar.

According to Reese (2009), the order's written and oral traditions credit the work of two Somali Shaykhs, Abd al-Rahman Zaylaci (c. 1820-1882) and Uways b. Muhammad, with its establishment in East Africa (1847-1909). Zaylaci is known as the order's primary reviver in Somalia, while Uways is remembered as its greatest publicist, spreading the tariqa not just throughout Somalia's towns and countryside, but even as far south as Zanzibar. Theoretically, the followers of the Qadiriyya order contain two main branches; each is named after his founder: Zayliciyya and Uwaysiyya. In reality, however, it appears as though these divides were meaningless to individual followers, who simply affixed the nisba "-Qadiri" names regardless of whatever shaykh they regarded their spiritual master (S. Reese, 2009, p. 12)

The Ahmadiyya follows Qadiriyya among the Somalis. Sayyid Ahmad ibn Idris al-Fasi (1760-1837) of Mecca and introduced to Somalia by Marka's 'Ali Maye Durogba of Merka.' Reese (1999), noted, "although less dramatic than the arrival of the Qadiriyya in Mogadishu, the appearance of the Ahmadiyya also attracted ready adherents from the urban peoples of the Benaadir" (Reese, 1999). The advent of the Ahmadiyya on the coast is credited not to the emergence of a single charismatic holy man but to the efforts of several shaykhs deputized to spread the word of the order by an Ahmadi leader from Arabia, Shaykh Mowlan Abd al-Rahman. According to most oral accounts, Shaykh Mowlan came to the Benaadir coast a few years before the return of Shaykh Uways and installed five pious men as representatives of the order. While never as numerically significant as their Qadiriyya counterpart, the Ahmadiyya had, by the end of the nineteenth century, spread throughout the Jubba valley, making it, by some accounts, the pre-eminent tariqa along the river

The establishment of the Ahmadiyya on the coast is attributed not to the appearance of a single charismatic holy man, but to the efforts of multiple shaykhs deputized by an Ahmadi leader from Arabia, Shaykh Mowlan Abd al-Rahman, to disseminate the message of the order. Shaykh Mowlan, according to the majority of oral traditions, arrived to the Benaadir coast a few years before Shaykh Uways's return and established five devout individuals as representatives of the order. While never as numerous as their Qadiriyya counterparts, the Ahmadiyya had expanded

across the Jubba valley by the end of the nineteenth century, making it, by some estimates, the preeminent tariqa along the river (Mataan 1994, as cited in Reese, 1999). During the same era, substantial Ahmadiyya communities developed in the cities of Barawe and Marka, respectively, under the leadership of Shaykhs Nurayn Ahmad Sabr and Ali Maye.

The third prominent Sufis were Saalihiyyah. In 1887, Muhammad ibn Salih established the Saalihiyyah as a descendant of Rashidiya founded by Ahmad ibn Idris's student Ibrahim al-Rashid (Ioan M Lewis, 1955). However, he is mainly important through his disciple, Mohammed ibn Salih, who founded the Salihiyyah with its headquarters in Mecca in 1887. Qadiriyyah was less organized than Salihiyyah, which was closer to the academy in Mecca. The least common, the Rifaiyyah order, is found among the Arabs who moved to Somalia; however, not widely spread among the Somali community (Bade 2020). Finally, Abdullahi al-al-Majmuca Qutbl's al-Mubaraka has historically been considered as a heresiography attacking Sayyid Muhammad' Abdullah Hasan's rival Salihiyya Sufi order as a bunch of pro-Wahhabi heretics (S. Reese, 2009, p. 14).

Despite any Sufi group's perspective and believe, they transformed and introduced new ways of living to the Somali course. Sufis established a community with shared interests other clannism. This community was united by Islamic brotherhood and Sufism. Most of this community was founded by a Sufi cleric who settled down, influenced others through their Sufi discipline path. Sufi communities expanded and kept their interests together.

To some extent, they used to declare jihads. The most prominent Sufi communities were Bardhere, Benadir and Biyoley communities. Their leaders, including Sheikh Uweys Al Baraawi at Biyooley killed by Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan. Sayid Mohamed was one of the prominent founders and leaders of Salihiyya communities in Somalia. He was also one of the first and most potent anti-colonial movements in Africa. He fought against the British, Italian colonies and the Ethiopian empire for 21 years between 1900-1921. The Sufi communities were gaining popularity; however, the arrival of colonialists limited their movement.

4.0 COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL SOMALI COMMUNITY TRANSFORMATION

The strategic significance of the Horn of Africa attracted the eyes of the European powers. However, the European power's introduction into the Horn of Africa was portrayed by pillage and rob. As Samatar documented down "In 1516, Zeila, which Burton later described as the 'great market of those ports', was overrun and burned to the ground by the Portuguese (Ahmed Ismail Samatar, 1988, p. 14). Later, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese committed similar destruction against other trading cities in southern Somalia. However, despite these brutal invasions, the vast and sprawling Ottoman Empire took the first very nominal steps towards official incorporation in the seventeenth century (Ahmed Ismail Samatar, 1988, p. 14).

In 1865, with the race for overseas territories quickening, the sultan of the Ottoman Empire awarded the Somali commercial coastal towns to the Egyptians (Samatar, 1988, p. 16). Nine years later, Zeila and Berbera, among others, fell under the suzerainty of the Khedive of Egypt, who, though officially under the Ottoman Empire, was for all practical purposes autonomous

enough to have his own goals and ambitions around the Red Sea area (Samatar, 1988, p. 16). However, despite many challenges, including the Ethiopian recurrent resistance and the British domination, the Somali territory falls into the hands of European colonizers in the 1880s.

In the 19th century, just like other parts of Africa, Somalis were divided into five regions. British Colony took the British Protectorate of Somaliland (current Somaliland), Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, and Hawd and Reserve Area. Northern Frontier District and Hawd and Reserve Area, also known as Ogaden, was given to Ethiopian Empire. The French took Djibouti, whereas the Italians took southern Somalia. The arrival of the colonials and their political decision paved the way for one of the most significant community transformations; as Samatar 1988, noted: “From the Somali perspective, these profound changes brought in their wake negative economic, political, and social ramifications” (Samatar, 1988, p. 21). The transformation impacted almost every aspect of Somali life—economically, socially, politically, and legally.

4.1 Transformation of the Economic Structure

The economic structure of Somalis was communal which the family was the unit of production. The families were autonomous units which the entire economy depended on their independent production. Initially, the motive for production was use-value, yet not atomistic. Instead, these contingent groups or households (Reer in Somali) were loosely linked by clan affiliations, especially in times of need. The men practiced farming and livestock herding among the ancient Somalis, whereas women used to do domestic activities like traditional home building, cooking, and caring for the children. They owned what they produced independently. Before the arrival of colonials, the Somalis families used to have their livestock and farms, and brokers facilitated the livestock trade. The output of their efforts—production- belonged to them and consumed for themselves unless they gave aid and charity to the poor, clan affiliates. However, the Somali economy transformed dramatically and what Marx called alienation commenced among the Somalis.

The British, the prominent actor, had some strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and started establishing a relationship with Somalis before imposing the colonial administration. The watershed in the British-Somali relationship was the British occupation of the port of Aden in 1839-40 in order to establish a way-station to India (Samatar, 1988, p. 18). It was from Aden that Burton set out on his famous First Footsteps into East Africa. Soon, Aden and its newly arrived military personnel needed a source of meat supplies. With abundant sheep, goats, cattle and camels, and so close to Aden, the Somali coast was a convenient logistical choice (Samatar, 1988, p. 18).

When the colonials arrived, the need for livestock increased explicitly; the British Colony wanted meat for their soldiers in Yemen and India. The need for meat paved the way for the emergence of Somali tradesmen, which Ahmed Samater called the “Haajiyo”. This emerging class, “the Somali Bourgeoise,” was between the colonial and Somalis. In essence, the Somali economic structure transformed. As Samatar argues, the Somalis experienced a significant transformation by the dawn of the twentieth century. First, pre-colonial pastoral Somali territories had been gradually encroached on by Middle Eastern and other Asian traders. Second, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European colonialism had established itself

in the Somali areas. Both these historical developments had a heavy impact on Somali society. The Arabs built the first bridgeheads for the external onslaught. This facilitated the creation of an incipient category of Somali collaborators, Abbaans in particular, who were to become the predecessors of the petite bourgeoisie. The result was a gradual shifting from a subsistence economy to market pastoralism.

Moreover, local industries, such as Banadir and Haraar cloth manufacturing, were destroyed by cheaper British and American textile products. This emerging class, “the Somali Bourgeoisie,” was between the colonial and Somalis. Consequently, many Somali communities lost their production through this transformation and shifted to urban areas under the colonial to work for someone else. At this point, the alienation of the Somali communities emerged. The impact of Somali community transportation is relevant. Many pastoralists and farmers are losing their production and shifting towards the urban areas to look for work opportunities. It is evident that jobs are scarce among the present Somali communities since massive unemployment is relevant.

4.2 The transformation of the traditional public rules system

Somali communities have for centuries been governed by laws that it has established and agreed upon despite the lack of central government. There were many rules for the ancient Somalis, including pastoral law, agricultural law, hunting law, urban law (Mansuur, 2016, p. 287). These rules have some things in common and specific things related to socio-economic issues in the area, and each of these rules has its own set of sub-rules (Mansuur, 2016, p. 287). Somalis gather under a big tree to discuss community issues, trial issues, exchange poems and play games. In a trial of two people in a dispute, they needed to come together along the council containing various parts. The council, including the Guurti (elders), is selected to represent and mediate cultural issues for advice and sort things out. Xeerbeegti (Jury), who know the law or make it, are arbitrators and know to resolve disputes. Buuni is a priest or theologian who resolves matters when it comes to legal matters. Guddoonshe (chairperson) is a traditional leader (king, sultan, and sultan) who is the chairperson and finally announces the council’s decision. Muddaac (Plaintiff) is the person who is suing someone else. Muddaac-Calayhi (Defendant) is the person being sued. Qareen (lawyer) is the person the plaintiff delegates to the case. The interviewer (wargure) is the interviewer of the plaintiff and defendant. Naawile (recorder) is the man who is recording the news, and he should miss nothing. Markhaati (Witness) is the person who bears witness to what one of the two is saying (Mansuur, 2016, p. 288).

Before proceeding with the trial, it is necessary first to determine the nature of the case; is it the eldest? In other words: was there a case before it that was being tried, or is it new? When those questions are answered, the trial begins following the social contract (xeer) guideline agreed. The key delicts were homicide (dil), injury (qoon) and insult (dhaliil): for dil, the compensation was mag, for qoon, it was qoomaal, and for dhaliil, it was xaal (Lewis, 1999, p. 162). The mag was the same for male and female irrespective of age, rank or wealth: for the male, it was set at 100 camels, although between the Gadabursi and Eisa, it was set at ten she-camels, ten cows, 100 sheep and goats, and one’ nubile girl fitted out for marriage’ (Lewis, 1999, p. 168); for a female, it was set at 50 camels. The payment of xaal was regulated by a code.

Offence is committed that required the payment of xaal included striking with a shoe or a whip, slapping with a hand (which was categorized into three forms: dhirbaxo (slapping with the palm), faragorgor (slapping with the back of the hand), and tanatoomo (slapping with the arm by a blow from the shoulder)), breaking into a house without permission, having failed to marry a girl after betrothal (Mohamed, 2007). The compensation for these offenses varies. One pony was the remuneration for whipping someone (valued at five camels or 45 sheep, since one camel was valued at nine sheep). If the whip blow produced injury (qoon), the harm would be evaluated, and compensation provided in addition to the xaal compensation. Remuneration for qoon, like compensation for xaal, was governed by code. For the loss of an eye or a limb, the recompense was half the blood money, or fifty camels for male injuries and twenty-five camels for female injuries. Other injuries were divided into two: (1) those that caused swelling (barar) and (2) those that caused an open wound that led to bleeding (nabar) (Mohamed, 2007). The latter is divided into several classes, the most serious of which are: a penetrating wound to the throat or abdomen; a wound that severely destroys tissue without cutting it off—for example, causing limping (naafo); and a wound that severs a finger or toe. (Mohamed, 2007).

The intensity of skull injuries was graded using a code system and four levels of severity. First, a wound that subjected the skull (lafcadaatay). Second, a wound that generated a depression. Third, a crack wound, and finally brain scar are all instances of wounds that expose the skull. Five camels were given for revealing the scalp, ten camels for causing a depression in the skull, and fifteen camels for fracturing the skull. Thirty-three camels and one-third camels were paid for exposing the brain. The compensation for exposing the scalp was five camels; for causing a depression in the skull ten camels; for fracture of the skull fifteen camels; and for exposing the brain thirty-three and one-third camels (Mohamed, 2007). The teeth were valued: each was worth five camels. So were fingers and toes: they were valued at ten camels each, while every joint of the fingers and toes was equivalent to three and one-third camels (Drake-Brockman, 1912). In addition to this, there is a code for marriage, divorce, inheritance, stealing, robbery, fray, etc.

The colonial arrival transformed the Somali public traditional rules. The colonial's subversion to the traditional system took two ways, as Mohamed (2007) argues: for political reasons, the colonial administration forced the community a new set of rules to resolve legal issues. The political class launched a strike on the traditional social contract. In the meantime, the administration had two distinct aims in the early and late colonial periods. In the early colonial period, it aimed to produce chiefs, and in the later colonial period, it aimed to build contemporary institutions led by a modern elite. The government decided to concentrate on establishing a modern judicial system.

The administration established two courts: the Qadi (Islamic) court and the district courts, overseen by the Appellate court. The Qadi courts primarily dealt with marriage, divorce, inheritance, and so on, whereas the district courts dealt with crimes like murder, damage, theft, robbery, property disputes, etc. The colonial administration established the Qadi (Islamic) court and the district courts. The Qadi courts primarily dealt with marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. District courts dealt with crimes like murder, theft, robbery, property disputes. The district court was the key legal institution in the country through which the administration replaced the 'traditional unofficial settlements' (xeer) with a new system (Reece as cited in Mohamed, 2007). The new public system imposed by the colonial administration was based on the Indian

Penal Law and the India Code of Civil Procedure which is relevant today. This process had already begun in the early colonial period when the government (especially in the 1930s) increasingly tried murder cases even when the cases were settled in the rural areas according to Somali law (Mohamed, 2007). Consequently, the transformation was not advantageous to the Somalis. Notwithstanding the imposed new and alien rule system, restrictions and prohibitions were put on the Western tradition trained lawyers; even it was not allowed to protest against the injustice of the new legal system.

Somali communities have traditionally shared an identical understanding of justice. Under the colonial authority, the old, shared notion gave way to a new one that was never ‘communal’, certainly not transparent, and hence never public. Somalis could not read, write, or talk, and those schooled in the new regulations were not permitted to practice law.

4.3 Identity Transformation

The colonial’s participation of the Somali lands into five regions transformed the Somali national identity. Although Somalis organized as communities before the colonials rather than having a national identity, they had a form essentialist form of national identity. The essentialist school of thought identifies a national identity as fixed by ancestry, shared history of the language, ethnicity, and world views (Connor, 1994; Kneip, 2007). However, the colonials’ partition and administration dispersed the Somalis beyond new borders into five countries: Somaliland (northern regions), Somalia (southern regions), Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The new borders formed a type of civic identity in which Somali communities became part of other countries. The civic identity focuses on shared values of government rights and the legitimacy of state institutions. The Somali communities accessed national identity, which they shared with other ethnicities. Since Somalis did not have centralized administrations, they started to experience the formation of new geopolitics. The British Colony signed an agreement with major Somali clans and other colonials (Italy, France and Ethiopian Empire). Those agreements ignited the jurisdiction of new borders, law, identity and taxation. Somalis are regarded as one of the most homogenous people in Africa. However, the new jurisdiction created a divisive identity among the Somalis—Somali Ethiopian, Somali British, Somali French (Djibouti) and Somali Kenyan. Finally, this jurisdiction caused the formation of disputed borders in East Africa.

4.4 Sufi communities’ transformation during the colonial period

On the other hand, Sufi communities transformed from only faith-based communities to anti-colonial movements in the Somali communities. The Uwasiyya went further, as seen in the Islamic conversions after the Maji Rebellion, to show those who were not Islamized or only partially that Islam practiced correctly was their only defense against the colonial powers (Ahmed, 1989). Moreover, given the large numbers and varied class and ethnic groups joined the Uwasiyya (Ahmed, 1989). Islam was perceived as an effective belief system that would enable the people to fight the colonialist (Bade, 2020a).

Meanwhile, in Southern Somalia and East Africa, the Uwasiyya was gaining a following, and in Northern Somalia, the Zeyli’iya still held sway among various clans in the region, the Salihya was struggling for its life against British colonialism and the hearts of Somalis everywhere. Said Mohammad Abdulle Hassan, the forefather of Somali nationalism, used

religion and nationalism to wage war against British, Italian colonies, and Ethiopian empires even though he was a successful military leader (Bade, 2020a).

It is worth mentioning that the colonial period was a pivotal moment for the Somali community's transformation. During the colonial period, especially during the fights against the colonials, Somali nationalism was born. The concept of Somali nationalism was to seek independence for all Somali lands, come together and create a nation-state for all Somali nations. On the other hand, as nationalism rose, the Somali community began transforming from clanship and genealogy to nation. Luling says, "Firstly, there is the attempt to reject the whole system of clanship and genealogy". This began with the rise of Somali nationalism immediately after the Second World War, culminating in independence for the former Italian and British Somali territories in 1960 (Luling, 2006a). This movement, which began among the urbanized and educated elite rather than among the rural public, rested on an ideal of national unity, undifferentiated 'Somaliness' (Luling, 2006a). Following the Somali independence, Somalis witnessed urbanizations that transformed their lifestyle.

Before the fall of the Somali military government in 1991, Somali governments worked hard to create imagined communities—based on greater Somalia. The Idea of greater Somalia aimed to unite all Somalis in the Horn of Africa into one state, "nation-state". Thus, the civil governments from 1960-1969 represented democratic communities with a multiparty system. Following the military coup in 1969, the dictator created a secular imagined socialist community. He later withdrew from the socialist allies in 1978 due to Ethiopia and Somali war disagreements. After the fall of the government, Somali clans' militias and radical Islamists arose. About a decade, Somalis experienced life without government when all negotiations failed. During the decade without government, Islamists tried to create Islamic communities, fighting against the imagined secular community the state had created prior. The Islamists fought against the lifestyle of the imagined secular communities. They tried to close cinemas, sports centers warned against the music and so on. In contrast, they distributed radical Islamist stuff.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Somali communities experienced significant transformations throughout their history. The most significant transformations occurred before the colonials, whereas the arrival of the colonials also transformed the Somali communities forever. Before the colonials, the Somali communities experienced the primary transformation from their immigration and settlement to East Africa. As the Somali communities containing four mixed groups—hunters, pastoralists, farmers and urban communities- settled, forming imagined clan communities with kinship genealogy and contract came into existence. Since clan communities developed, leadership became a crucial need, and the traditional leader system also formed. Although the Somali communities did not practice giving titles to the leaders, it is a part of the transformation they inherited from the Arab and other mixed sultanates. Another significant imagined community also emerged—the Sufi communities. The Sufi communities took different directions by common faith, which gained popularity among the communities to some extent it reached to take jihads. The Sufi transformation has been changing over time. Sufism was faith-based communities and anti-colonial movement forces during the colonial period, including the

Uweysiya—Qadiriyya Sufi community and the Salihiyya of Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan. He had been fighting against the colonial for 20 years.

On the other hand, the colonial course paved the way for momentous transformation for the Somali communities. The Somali economy was independent which the family was the unit of production. Nevertheless, the colonial's arrival ignited a new market of meat for the British armies in Adan. At this stage, a new Somali bourgeois named "Haajiyo" between the colonials and Somali communities started; this new way of production dispossessed many Somalis' independence of means of production, destroyed their economy and facilitated the search for new jobs. In addition to this, colonials ignored the Somali public traditional system of rules. They imposed a new, untransparent, unfair and inapplicable system of rule, especially the British Colony who imposed the Indian Penal Law and the India Code of Civil Procedure which is relevant today. Furthermore, the colonial's partition of the Somali lands into five which currently comprise different countries—Djibouti, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia created jurisdiction of discrete identities among the Somalis. This jurisdiction facilitated the division of the Somali communities and the formation of Somali nationalism, which caused prolonged conflicts in East Africa.

Hence, the Somali transformation of the Somali community and post colonials has taken a long way to the present Somali lives—the most significant transformation during the pre-colonial period was the formation of imagined clan communities, genealogy, leadership, and traditional rules of law Islamic faith-based Sufism. Transformation of Somali community economic structure, public traditional rules system and creation of discrete national identities were major community transformations the colonial. Finally, the question about Somali origin, which carries two contested perspectives—Arabness and being part of the Cushitic family in East Africa remains open for discussion.

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