THE PEACE, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS APPROACH TO ADDRESS VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

Peace, security, and development are the three most important pillars of a healthy social system. Although these concepts are independent of each other, they are mutually interlinked and complementary pillars of sustainable development and peace. Linking development, peacebuilding, and security promotion and integrating them into national strategies and planning processes in post-conflict African countries has the potential to create synergies and more effective policies that prevent relapses into conflict as well as address social and regional inequalities and vulnerabilities. This paper discusses some aspects of the development process in post-conflict countries in Africa based on the case studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and South Sudan.

Keywords: Africa, African Union, conflict, development, peace, security

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The interlinkages between peace, security, and development and their implications for realizing the African Union's (AU) vision of "creating an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful continent driven by its citizens" are well set up in the foundational instruments of the AU. Moreover, the preamble of the Constitutive Act and the aims of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union affirm the promotion of peace, security, and stability as prerequisites for sustainable development (African Union, 2022). The pursuit of these interconnections has perennially informed the activities of the Peace and Security Council and the African Union Commission as a whole.

Violent conflicts and insecurity inhibit development and integration by diverting resources to non-socioeconomic development areas such as the military. In 2021, military expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) totaled $20.1 billion, 4.1 percent higher than in 2020. Today, the amounts that AU member states are distributing to military spending place significant strains on national budgets, threatening debt sustainability, and negatively affecting budget allocations to social investments in health, education, water, and sanitation (African Union, 2022).

The increasingly protracted and recurrent nature of crises means that there is a greater range of overlapping and compounding needs and rising uncertainty within these contexts. Hence, there is a greater urgency to respond to and address the inequalities that put certain groups at

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particular and long-term risks, e.g., marginalized communities, women, and youth. A more comprehensive approach would offer opportunities to respond more effectively to people's needs.

There is increasing recognition among development partners of the need to holistically address the issue of conflict, security, and development as articulated in the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD's) African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, which aims to "address the nexus between peace, security, and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding" (NEPAD, 2005, p. iv).

The nexus approach stems in part from a recognition that emergency needs (and the identities of those most affected) are often symptoms of underlying issues that reflect broader inequalities and injustices. The nexus is an opportunity to engage with these root causes and recognize that security crises can be caused and/or heightened by poor development policies and a lack of inclusive and proper development investment. Thus, meeting lifesaving needs and, at the same time, ensuring longer-term investment in addressing the systemic causes of conflict and vulnerability has a better chance of reducing the impact of cyclical or recurrent shocks and stresses and supporting the peace that is essential for development to be sustainable (Oxfam, 2019).

Unlike the earlier efforts, the nexus dialogue goes beyond a programmatic or conceptual approach. It relates to ongoing structural shifts across the aid system that are changing how aid is planned and financed. These will have profound implications for what we do, how we do it, and with whom we do it.

The nexus approach has been complemented by the AU's reflections on resilience, mitigation, and adaptation strategies, given the heavy toll of climate change on peace and security. Africa's development, peace and security, and integration landscapes have registered several achievements over the last decade, including sustained levels of economic growth, though the rate is still low; several successful election cycles; and sustained cooperation between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms to promote integration and develop mechanisms to address complex security challenges. However, the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of governments, with the varying intensities of armed conflicts, violent confrontations, and violent extremism, has continued to derail the continental development agenda, being held back by poorly functioning governments (Dumitru & Hayat, 2015). At the same time, "human trafficking, drug smuggling, and the flow of refugees can make borders meaningless or at least blurred, while civil unrest or ethnic hostility can tear a country apart as easily as a coup d'état" (Jones, 2009, p. 3).

The triple nexus approach underscores that security is a public good and can no longer be decoupled from the continent's economic development and prosperity. Security issues must, therefore, be factored into investments and development interventions. If the current trend in the escalation of conflicts and insecurity goes unabated, the momentum generated by the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and other AU regional integration initiatives will eventually wane. It is, therefore, critical to engage and reflect on ways to amplify the potential of the regional integration initiatives to promote peace, security, investments, and development. Deeper and more meaningful engagement at the strategic and policy levels is needed to open

new channels of dialogue and exchanges among various parts of governments, academia, the private sector, and civil society to increase mutual trust and understanding and address the root causes of insecurity.

1.1 Conceptual Issues

Peace refers to the absence of violent conflicts. It has always been at the center of the vision of African countries and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which is now known as the African Union (AU). Peace continues to take center stage in Africa's development agenda as enshrined in Agenda 2063, whose vision is to "build an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its citizens, and representing a dynamic force in the international arena" (African Union, n.d., p.1).

Security is the absence of political, social, economic, and environmental threats to individuals or communities in a particular society. It refers to actions that put people first and provide them with a sense of security in their homes, at their jobs, and in their communities. It encompasses the idea of liberty, specifically in its two pillars of "freedom from fear" (human rights) and "freedom from want" (basic human needs) (United Nations Development Programmer, 1994). The threat to human security, especially in post-conflict countries, is poverty, disease, and armed violence—what Amartya Sen has called the "dark side of development" (Sen, 2003, pp. 8–9).

Human security covers both conflict and the development aspects of peace and sustainable development. Post-conflict countries suffer from the lack of both types of freedom and, therefore, require a multidimensional policy framework that guides these countries in transitioning from post-conflict to sustainable development and peaceful societies.

The triple nexus approach addresses the protection of people from critical and pervasive threats to their lives, livelihoods, and dignity and covers both development and peace as well as human security issues. It addresses crises, violent conflicts, poverty, and inequality with the goal of peaceful integration and sustainable development.

The triple nexus approach was proposed to address the complex and intertwined socio-economic, political, and security crises that affect and feed into each other. This approach acknowledges that today's complex and protracted crises cannot be addressed through the development approach alone but should be complemented with security actions and peacebuilding strategies (see Figure 1). The triple nexus concept also acknowledges that human insecurity may be caused or affected by political actions, which feed inequality and increase vulnerability and conflict.

Figure 1: Illustration of the Triple Nexus Concept

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2019). Connecting the dots on the triple nexus. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/connecting-dots-triple-nexus

The first World Humanitarian Summit was held in 2016, and the Agenda for Humanity (United Nations, 2016) that came out of it was the first to propel the concept of the triple nexus into mainstream development discourse. The summit had a clarion call for a shift from a silo approach to a comprehensive and integrated strategy involving peacebuilding, security, and development to effectively respond to today's complex crises that require a multidimensional strategy.

At the summit, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General spoke emphatically about the importance of this approach to address the security crisis, violent conflicts, and peace. In line with the resolution of the Summit, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other development agencies began advocating the importance of prioritizing the triple nexus approach. Consequently, the UN and the World Bank came up with the "New Way of Working" to deliver the triple nexus approach (United Nations, 2017a).

The first AU Policy Conference on Promoting the Peace, Security, and Development Nexus was held in Tangier, Kingdom of Morocco, from October 25–27, 2022. The conference reaffirmed the importance of the triple nexus approach to development, especially in post-conflict countries. The participants underscored the importance of African capacities for planning and implementation of programs and peacebuilding projects; the nexus between security and developmental programs; the need for inclusive and accountable governance; and the role of border communities and agro-pastoralists in promoting regional socio-economic integration (UNECA, 2022).

The participants also emphasized the critical role of connecting communities for sustainable development and the interlinkages between inter-African trade, industrialization, infrastructure development, and peace through the effective implementation of the AfCFTA. Conference

participants also pledged to work towards reaching regional integration and the free movement of people, goods, and services through the harmonization of economic, financial, and monetary cooperation (UNDP, 2022).

The link between peace, security, and development was also articulated in the 2000 Millennium Declaration and documented in the outcome of the 2005 World Summit with the acknowledgment that peace and security, development, and human rights are three fundamental pillars of the UN system and the foundation of the achievement of collective security and global well-being. It was affirmed by the 2014 United Nations (UN) General Assembly, which ignited discussions on the nexus between peace, security, and development and its relevance to the post-2015 development agenda.

The World Bank unpacked the link between peace, security, and development in its 2011 World Development Report (WDR) and recommended specific strategies for fragile and stable nations, citing that the former require: restored confidence; institutional transformation for the provision of citizen security, justice, and jobs; regional and international action to mitigate external tensions; and specialized donor support (World Bank, 2011).

The AU adopted a Common African Position (CAP), in which the continent's leadership acknowledged the importance of peace and security and the undeniable link between peace, security, and development (African Union, 2014). The AU is committed to addressing the root causes of conflict by, among other things, strengthening cross-border cooperation for the resolution of disputes and the promotion of cross-border security while addressing economic and social inequalities and exclusion; strengthening good and inclusive governance; fighting against all forms of discrimination; and forging unity in diversity through democratic practices and mechanisms at the local, national, and continental levels.

It is, therefore, important to emphasize that sustainable development in Africa requires deliberate clarity on the factors that continue to hinder peace and security while paralyzing economic development on the continent. Regional integration stays a practical choice for addressing security challenges in order to improve economic cooperation and trade relations in Africa for sustainable development.

1.2 Recognizing the Importance of Peace

There has been an increased emphasis on peace as the third part of the nexus. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has placed sustainable peace at the top of his agenda (United Nations, 2017a) and has rolled out his vision for a UN that can prevent conflict and integrate development, human rights, and peace and security approaches (United Nations, 2017b). Including peace in the nexus acknowledges the importance of conflict resolution and prevention in reducing poverty and ensuring sustainable development. However, with less history of integration into sector-wide security and development activities, there is far less agreement around what "peace" means and its implications. There are also concerns that engaging in peace processes could compromise the security principles of independence and impartiality by appearing to support or align with a particular group or solution.

The 2016 UN resolutions on sustaining peace recognize that conflict and fragility also exist on a spectrum (Ponzio, 2018). Pockets of violence co-exist with areas in which people go about

their daily lives seemingly unaffected by violent conflict. The absence of violence does not equate to peace, and sustaining peace requires ongoing efforts led by national actors that must be underpinned by inclusion. In 2017, an estimated 87, 0000 women were killed globally in incidents related to sexual and gender-based violence (UNWOMEN, n.d.). In the same year, nearly 69,000 people were killed as a direct consequence of state-based armed conflict (Dupuy & Rustad, 2018).

Thus, when discussing the nexus, different actors interpret "peace" differently, often seemingly according to their respective interests and agendas. For international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), it usually means integrating better conflict sensitivity and supporting social cohesion or peacebuilding, although there is an understanding that these need to be linked to official processes (Milner & Chan, 2018). On the other hand, the European Union (EU), for example, interprets "peace" as covering activities from conflict prevention and early warning through mediation and conflict response to security and stabilization.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

This paper is based on data collected from secondary sources. Studies conducted on similar issues locally, regionally, and internationally were reviewed. Documents, which include the United Nations Reports, World Bank Reports, National Development Strategies, and National Strategies on Triple Nexus Approaches (where available) in the target countries, were reviewed. The paper used both quantitative and qualitative data.

2.1 Socio-Economic Development Initiatives in Post-Conflict States

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is home to more than 1 billion people, half of whom will be under 25 years old by 2050. It is a diverse continent offering human and natural resources that have the potential to yield inclusive growth and eradicate poverty in the region. With the world's largest free trade area and a 1.2-billion-person market, the continent is creating an entirely new development path, harnessing the potential of its resources and people (World Bank, 2022a).

The region is composed of low-, lower-middle-, upper-middle-, and high-income countries, 22 of which are fragile or conflict-affected. Africa also has 13 small states, characterized by a small population, limited human capital, and a confined land area. Economic growth in SSA is estimated at 4 percent in 2021, up from a contraction in economic activity of 2 percent in 2020 (World Bank, 2022a). However, growth in the region is expected to decelerate in 2022 amid a global environment with multiple (and new) shocks, high volatility, and uncertainty. The economy is set to expand by 3.6 percent in 2022, down from 4 percent in 2021, as it struggles to pick up momentum amid a slowdown in global economic activity, continued supply constraints, outbreaks of new coronavirus variants, high inflation, and rising financial risks due to high and increasingly vulnerable debt levels (World Bank, 2022a).

The invasion of Ukraine compounds the factors holding back recovery in the region. Although the direct trade and financial linkages with Russia and Ukraine are small, the war will likely impact SSA economies through higher commodity, food, and fuel prices, as well as high inflation, tightening of global financial conditions, and reduced foreign financing flows into the region. The growth effects in the region are expected to be marginal. However, the largest

impact is on the increasing likelihood of civil strife because of food- and energy-fueled inflation amid an environment of heightened political instability.

Prospects for the East and Southern African sub-region show a sustained recovery (4.1 percent) from the recession, dropping to 3.1 percent in 2022 and then settling around 3.8 percent in 2024. The Western and Central Africa sub-region is projected to grow by 4.2 percent in 2022 and 4.6 percent in 2023. The 2022 forecast is revised by 0.6 percentage points compared to the October 2021 forecast, largely reflecting upgrades in Nigeria. Economic activity in SSA is projected to grow at 3.9 percent and 4.2 percent in 2023 and 2024, respectively (World Bank, 2022a). A recovery in global demand is expected in 2023 as most of the shocks dragging down the global economy are expected to dissipate.

As a result of supply shocks predating the war in Ukraine, emerging signs of stagflation are posing challenges to monetary policymaking. Central banks are facing a trade-off between accommodating the weak economy at the risk of worsening inflationary prospects and fighting inflation at the high cost of triggering a recession. Many central banks in the region have chosen the second policy choice so far and embarked on a tightening cycle, but others have kept a more dovish stance.

Since October 2021, countries in the region have been classified as being at moderate or elevated risk of debt distress, with the proportion of countries at high risk of debt distress increasing from 52.6 to 60.5 percent. To address the rising risks of debt sustainability, some countries in the region implemented austerity measures; however, these actions have been insufficient to reduce debt levels (World Bank, 2022a).

This paper discusses some aspects of the development process in post-conflict countries in Africa based on the case studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and South Sudan.

2.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

2.2.1 Context

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), about the size of Western Europe, is the largest country in SSA. The DRC is endowed with exceptional natural resources, including minerals such as cobalt and copper, hydropower potential, significant arable land, immense biodiversity, and the world's second-largest rainforest (World Bank, 2022b).

Most people in the DRC have not received help from this wealth. A long history of conflict, political upheaval, instability, and authoritarian rule has led to a grave and ongoing security crisis. In addition, there has been forced displacement of populations. These features have not changed significantly since the end of the Congo War in 2003. According to the BBC, as recently as November 15, 2022, there has been heavy fighting between the army of the DRC and M23 rebels some 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) from the eastern city of Goma. The rebels want to seize the regional capital, Goma, to force the government to make concessions (Atuhaire, 2022).

The DRC is among the five poorest nations in the world. In 2021, nearly 64 percent of Congolese, or just under 60 million people, lived on less than $2.15 a day. About one out of six people living in extreme poverty in SSA lives in the DRC (World Bank, 2022b).

The DRC faces a myriad of challenges ranging from staggering security issues and chronic underdevelopment to political instability and protracted armed conflict in the eastern part of the country. Security, development, and peace actors are all present in the country to support the government and the population. Given the DRC's multifaceted challenges on the one hand and the country's enormous potential to strengthen the coherence and effectiveness of different actors and flows of aid on the other, discussions about implementing a Peace, Security, and Development nexus approach in the DRC began in 2018 (United Nations, 2022).

2.2.2 Operational Environment

The peace security development nexus approach in the DRC is an inclusive and collective process that is aimed at reducing security needs, risks, and vulnerabilities in the medium- and long-term while addressing the underlying causes of crises and underdevelopment. It also works towards better coordination and complementarity between the three pillars. Key stakeholders include the government, the UN, and other international organizations, as well as national and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and donors. The approach is guided by four collective outcomes in the areas of food insecurity and malnutrition, access to basic social services, forced displacement, and gender-based violence.

The five provinces of Greater Kasai (Kasai, Kasai Central, Kasai Oriental, Lomami, and Sankuru) and the Tanganyika province were prioritized due to an improvement in the security situation, the withdrawal of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) from these areas, and the gradual transfer of the Mission's activities to relevant partners.

2.2.3 Aid Response

A Nexus Donor Group in the country, chaired by Sweden, supplies a forum for donors to achieve common definitions of the nexus and coordinate and ensure communication between donors across the pillars of the PSD nexus. The aim is for donors to integrate the collective outcomes into their bilateral strategies. Funding is provided by the three plans that guide the work in the three pillars of the nexus, namely the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP), and the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS). The donor group aims to create convergence among implementing organizations in the prioritized territories to achieve higher-level results and contribute to collective outcomes. In addition, the World Bank has recently opened an office in Kananga (Kasai Central) for closer oversight of its operations.

Besides regional and international commitments, the government has equally made commitments towards the implementation of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework. The government's program of action for the period 2021 to 2023, which is estimated to cost around $12 billion annually, covers the stabilization of the eastern provinces, the re-establishment of state authority, the promotion of good governance, the furtherance of the decentralization process, the improvement of infrastructure and basic social services, the

establishment of good relations with neighboring states, and the review and reinvigoration of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework (UN Secretary-General, 2021).

Additionally, on April 7, 2021, the National Assembly set up a special commission of inquiry on insecurity in the east of the country. On July 5, the President signed a decree setting up the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization Program, which merges the earlier National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and the National Stabilization and Reconstruction Program for Areas Emerging from Armed Conflict. On August 7, 2021 the President appointed Tommy Tambwe Ushindi as the National Coordinator of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization Program. Steps were also taken to strengthen security and defense cooperation with other signatory states of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework, including through the creation of a joint operations coordination center with Uganda in Beni, North Kivu Province, to share intelligence and coordinate actions against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and the signing on July 13, 2022, of a memorandum of understanding on peace and security with Burundi.

3.0 SOMALIA

3.1 Context

Somalia has one of the most complex and protracted states of crisis anywhere in the world. For the past 30 years, Somalia has experienced political instability and frequent conflict, coupled with environmental and economic shocks. These crises have resulted in widespread displacement, food insecurity, and elevated levels of poverty. Somalia has an intricate societal makeup, with complex dynamics governing geographic areas, clans, and ethnic groups. Following the collapse of the government led by Dictator Siad Barre in 1991, clan-based political coalitions and alliances fought for control throughout the country, with no effective federal government in place. A de facto government in the north declared the formation of an independent Republic of Somaliland in 1991 and continues to seek international recognition of its sovereignty. In 1998, Puntland's leaders in the northeast declared the territory an autonomous state within a federal Somalia. Both regions are, in effect, self-governing and keep relative stability in contrast to southern and central Somalia, which remain engulfed in inter-clan political violence. From early 2000, as Islamist militant groups filled the security vacuum and internationally backed forces conducted counterinsurgency operations in southern and central Somalia, conflict and security dynamics became increasingly complex and internationalized.

Over the last decade and a half, the international community's political and security agenda in Somalia has been dominated by two interrelated trends. Firstly, the international community supported reconciliation and state-building efforts aimed at achieving a political settlement among competing political/clan elites and setting up legitimate federal and state governance institutions. Secondly, an AU-backed international military offensive aimed at weakening Al-Shabaab and other militant Islamist groups while transferring and combining territorial control to legitimate government authorities.

In this context, Somalia took painstaking steps from being a "failed" to a "fragile" state. Although the political transition is still underway, substantial progress has been made in setting

up federal and state institutions. In 2004, a transitional federal government was set up. In 2012, Somalia elected a new president and federal parliament and adopted a provisional constitution, completing the transition to the new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). 2017 marked another turning point, as the FGS completed its first political transition since 2012, electing a new parliament and president through a limited, indirect electoral process. This triggered added international recognition and support for the FGS.

Somalia has since made further progress in setting up and rehabilitating political and government institutions, including the creation of four federal member states in southern Somalia (Jubal and, Southwest State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle). Somalia stays, however, an extremely fragile political and security environment. Although Al-Shabaab has been substantially weakened, it still retains control over large areas of central and southern Somalia and carries out terrorist attacks.

Despite progress in building Somalia's security architecture, the government continues to depend heavily on AU forces to keep security in strategic areas. In addition, Somalia's political situation stays fragile despite progress in its political transition; the path toward democratic elections has been challenging, and the key issues relating to the relationship between the federal government and federal member states still are unresolved. Furthermore, government infrastructure, institutions, and services are still in their infancy, and international agencies continue to supply many basic services.

In the context of ongoing armed conflict and political instability, Somalia has experienced persistent food insecurity, displacement, and health and protection crises over the past 30 years. Three-fifths of Somalia's economy is based on agriculture, with livestock raising being the biggest sector. The dominance of pastoralism and rain-fed agriculture makes the population highly vulnerable to climate shocks and natural disasters. Furthermore, Somalia has high rates of poverty, with 69 percent of the population living under the international poverty line of US$1.90 a day and an added 10 percent living within 20 percent of it (World Bank, 2016). This means that almost 80 percent of the population is especially vulnerable to climate-related shocks, conflict, and economic disruption.

In December 2019, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimated that 5.2 million Somalis needed humanitarian aid, of which 63 percent were children. Up to 2.1 million Somalis were facing severe hunger if humanitarian aid was not available (OCHA, 2019); food and nutrition deficiencies are especially prevalent in agro-pastoral, marginalized, and displaced communities. Inadequate water, sanitation, and health services in many areas increase the risks of disease outbreaks, including cholera, diarrhea, and, more recently, COVID-19 (OCHA, 2019).

3.2 Operational Environment

In Somalia, the absence of legislation is due to a lack of progress on reconciliation, which results in the political space not being inclusive enough yet and marginalized groups continuing to use violence or align with violent extremist groups as a means of protection. Those groups that are included in the state-building process continue to oppose each other, thereby blocking constitutional reforms and the passing of key laws.

The United Nations system has a United Nations Strategic Framework, an HRP, a Comprehensive Approach to Security, and a more recent Recovery Resilience Framework, thus highlighting the need for bridging security and development frameworks. Each of these frameworks is supported by mostly separate coordination structures with parallel meetings. The result, at the Mogadishu level, is that some staff must take part in more than 30 meetings per week where similar issues are discussed in slightly different configurations with the same group of people. This diffuses accountability and promotes effective decision-making. There has been a recognition that there are too many meetings at the Mogadishu level and not enough at the state level. Lessons are leading to a change in coordination architecture by merging working groups that overlap and pooling resources between the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), and the United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia (UNSOM) (e.g., the UNSOM regional heads of office role will include UNCT/HCT coordination) within the United Nations to have more senior capacity at the sub-national level (IOM, 2019).

The 2018 Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) planning process has been hailed as a success. It built on the Disaster Impact Needs Assessment analysis from 2017, which put the FGS in the driver's seat from the onset. While the RRF has yet to be officially launched, the FGS is presenting it as the operational strategy for the resilience pillar of the National Development Plan.

3.3 Aid Response

In Somalia, with funding from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) piloted a multi-sectoral analysis product combining security, development, and peace data to inform the operationalization of the Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority/Accountability (CRESTA/A) strategy. The tool analyzed all publicly available datasets to find correlations that could be used for further field-level analysis to better prioritize interventions through area-based approaches.

An example of a gap analysis for education services in Somalia shows that at the national level, satisfaction with education services tends to decrease significantly beyond 10 kilometers from the nearest education facility. Extrapolating this finding allows for finding potential gaps in education service delivery for priority interventions (Faqih, 2021). The Ministry of Planning and Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED) in Somalia, in collaboration with the World Bank and the United Nations, has been mapping aid flows for the past three years. The mapping and disaggregation of humanitarian security and development aid in Somalia is an essential tool for helping the FGS, donors, and implementing partners' better plan and prioritize resources based on needs and ensure a proportional geographical distribution of funding.

The Somalia UN RCO has also set up a CRESTA/A unit since 2016. While the UN had envisioned playing an enabling role in security, humanitarian, and development issues, UNSOM teams worked together on community recovery and the extension of state authority and accountability. The team has primarily remained focused on its stabilization support role. In Somalia, the PBF has been a key enabler for the United Nations to do more joined-up programming linking recovery, stabilization, local governance, and peacebuilding. As of 2019, the PBF has invested 46 million USD in Somalia through 24 projects implemented by eleven

UN agencies in close partnership with the UNSOM, the FGS, the Federal Member States, and civil society (United Nations, 2020). The PBF fund has also been invested in programs that look to improve governance by enabling local authorities and communities to rebuild trust around the delivery of services, the resolution of local conflicts, and the provision of employment opportunities to Somalis. The risk-taking and catalytic nature of the fund enabled innovative, durable solutions and stabilization and development programming to increasingly work in concentrated geographic areas where only security and humanitarian agencies had previously worked. In addition to the catalytic funding provided by the UN PBF, the UN set up the country-based UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) for Somalia in 2015 (United Nations, 2015).

The MPTF aimed to supply the means for donors to provide unearmarked, multi-annual, and flexible funding towards the implementation of the peace and state-building goals as defined in the New Deal Compact for Somalia (2014–2016). In practice, donors continued to earmark their funding allocations. While the MPTF yielded greater transparency and coherence in donor contributions to the UN, bilateral funding continued to be distributed by donors, which affected oversight and coordination efforts with the FGS. The MPTF decisions were governed by the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF). The UN MPTF also created a National Window to channel funding directly through Somali government systems to help build and test them.

The Midnimo (Unity) project in Somalia, led by the FGS, the Southwest, and Jubbaland States' Ministries of Interior and jointly implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UN-Habitat, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has linked a community-based planning approach to a multidimensional community-driven response to displacement and instability. Once the communities and local authorities have set up community action plans, these are publicly shared with the local authorities, who then use them to coordinate the actions of other security and development actors. The Midnimo program at the (IOM) has gradually built synergies with other stabilization and health programs (e.g., mobile clinics, provision of medical supplies to maternal and child health clinics, etc.). These programs are now increasingly adopting an ad hoc area-based approach across IOM's health, durable solutions, and stabilization interventions. These programs all use the same principle of putting government counterparts at the forefront to ensure that they are credited for the outputs delivered. Midnimo is also being used to deliver upon the outcomes of political reconciliation processes by building on them and helping conflict parties deliver peace dividends to their constituents. This approach is being tested with UNSOM mediation support in Balcad and Galkayo. The Midnimo program was designed as part of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan for Somalia 2016–19.

Another program, the Daldhis (Build Your Country), sought to extend the Joint Programs on Local Governance (JPLG), Youth Employment, and Rule of Law in the same geographical areas as Midnimo (IOM, 2019). Over the past ten years, the JPLG has been instrumental in rebuilding local institutions and legal frameworks in Somaliland and Puntland, which has resulted in municipalities being able to increasingly complement development aid with locally raised tax revenues to finance service delivery. The JPLG has not only strengthened local institutions but also shown that (re)building a local tax base is a durable way to raise revenue for local authorities and solve chronic deficiencies in public service provision in towns like

Hargeisa, Burao, and Berbera while also improving their accountability to their citizens. Public co-funding is a key element in ending aid dependency.

The Somalia Resilience Program (SomReP), a consortium of seven INGOs (Action Against Hunger, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Oxfam, and World Vision), was formed in response to the 2011 famine in Somalia. The consortium developed a system based on early warning committees that have been trained to check indicators and develop contingency plans in their communities for rapid-onset (floods, conflict) and slow-onset (drought, climate change) disasters. By linking the community-level monitoring of indicators to early regional warnings from the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit/Famine Early Warning Systems Network through radio and SMS, the consortium members have been able to analyze information and make decisions much quicker. SomReP has coupled its Early Warning System context monitoring system with a pooled funding mechanism for prompt action.

In Somalia, the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) has been working with the RCO to develop a set of outcome-level indicators (based on the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) durable solutions framework) across the peace, security, and development spectrums to establish a common basis for monitoring progress in solving the protracted displacement crisis. For this purpose, it has also partnered with the Somali MoPIED, the NGO Africa Voices, the World Bank's High-Frequency Survey team, and Altai Consulting to develop a context monitoring tool coupled with public opinion surveys using radio shows and SMS surveys to have an objective means of measuring those same collective indicators (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2018).

4.0 SOUTH SUDAN

4.1 Context

Characterized as a protection crisis, communities in South Sudan experience multiple challenges, including intensified conflict and sub-national violence, a third consecutive year of major flooding, and the impacts of COVID-19. The South Sudan refugee crisis stays the largest in Africa since 2016. The signing of the peace agreement in 2018—the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)—led to a fragile truce that resulted in the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity in February 2020. As a result, hostility between the government and the main opposition has decreased, thus reducing insecurity, and increasing access to development operations.

Nevertheless, at the same time, localized violence has surged because of conflict over land and resources, cattle raiding, and revenge attacks. Violence affected more civilians in 2021 than in previous years. Due to preparations for the general elections in 2023 that should have been held in 2022, the first ones ever in this new country have not started. The protracted security crisis in South Sudan, with emergency and catastrophic food insecurity features, is presently severely aggravated by recurrent sub-national violence in Warrap State (Tonj) and Western Equatoria State (Tambura) and by floods of the river Nile and its tributaries (mainly in the Upper Nile, Unity, and Jonglei states) for the third year in a row. The entire community was forced to move to higher ground to escape the floodwaters. Flood-displaced people, many of whom are highly

vulnerable, were uprooted earlier by sub-national violence and the 2020 floods and are now again displaced.

While COVID-19 infections stay reportedly low and untraceable by the deficient health system, the pandemic still affected social services such as education, trade, and the economy. Overall, this contributed to rising inflation, while at the same time, the country is facing an epidemic of hepatitis E.

Atrocities are being committed in Tambura (Western Equatoria State), causing the displacement of 80,000 people since May 2021, as the Zande and Balanda tribes have clashed with one another, although they cohabitate well until peace was spoiled for political motives (Amnesty International, 2021). The Central Equatoria State remained unstable, and the National Salvation Front (NAS) is still not part of the peace agreement like other ex-rebel/opposition groups.

4.2 Operational Environment

The Triple Nexus concept is much less controversial in South Sudan than in other conflict settings like, for example, Pakistan or Mali (Hövelmann, 2020). The characteristics of the protracted crisis in South Sudan, its root causes, and the long-standing experience with a pragmatic, integrated approach on a community level make the Triple Nexus an interesting approach that is requested by local actors.

Moreover, the call for a more locally-led security action, as well as the associated localization processes, are further reasons to take the Triple Nexus idea seriously in this context. The abilities of local NGOs and the latter's traditionally integrated programming supply a potential for a Triple Nexus in the country.

International actors can learn from local actors, while long-term strategies for a shift from mostly humanitarian approaches to more security, peace-related development programs, or partnerships are needed. Local peace actors, such as faith-based organizations or facilities such as the Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility (CSRF), offer the potential to expand aid programs' impact in these fields or, at the very least, ensure conflict sensitivity and Make No Harm approaches. Moreover, limiting overall competition and expanding cooperation in these fields will be crucial for INGO actors.

In sum, a Triple Nexus approach in South Sudan supplies substantial potential, given that a series of criteria are met. Further CHA research has found criteria as relevant to analyze in which local contexts a triple nexus can result in the helpful overcoming of silos and in which it might be counterproductive (Südhoff et al., 2020). With local ownership, local abilities, limited external security interests, a peace-oriented UN approach, and a supportive UN framework in place, South Sudan has the potential to become a concrete example of action in the so far rather abstract Triple Nexus debate.

This case study also sheds light on a globally discussed challenge for making the Triple Nexus a meaningful approach. Where donors are promoting a Triple Nexus approach while keeping budget lines in silos and making them inflexible and short-term, a Triple Nexus approach will not materialize. This is even more of an issue in South Sudan, where donors are fading out of

support while limiting development engagement for political reasons. Against the backdrop of an identified "triple donor paradox," it will be crucial for South Sudan to determine whether flexible approaches like the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Trust Fund and Partnership for Recovery and Resilience (PfRR) will further make progress and become a model for donor policies and if donor engagement can be sustained. Therefore, to make the Triple Nexus effective in South Sudan, the very first challenge might be to prevent the country from becoming a forgotten crisis. In this sense, the Triple Nexus might also be an opportunity for South Sudan for another reason: as a vehicle to attract further international attention.

4.3 Aid Response

The South Sudan PfRR is a collection of donors, UN agencies, and NGOs working together to increase resilience and reduce the vulnerability of the South Sudanese people and the institutions that stand for them (Partnership for Recovery and Resilience, 2018). A central tenet of this effort is to supply a cohesive, comprehensive effort to cover a single geographic region, looking to address the security, development, and peacebuilding needs of that region, including addressing vulnerabilities and poverty reduction. The platform has tried to proactively push this agenda through the coordination of multiple actors. The effort, led by the Steering Committee, is dominated by donors and UN agencies (Partnership for Recovery and Resilience, 2018). In essence, the PfRR is a platform for donors and UN agencies to create a common understanding of how they, through partners, will approach security, peacebuilding, recovery, resilience, and development needs within a geographic area. According to one of the reports, PFRR is not a project or program but rather a platform for realigning joint efforts to supply collective and complementary support for resilience building (Partnership for Recovery and Resilience, 2018). Nevertheless, donors were expected to align their funding in these areas with the PfRR-linked Joint Work Plans.

As planned, the PfRR fits many of the criteria of a true example of the nexus approach. It is looking at the whole of the context (a geographic region), promoting collective outcomes, and coordinating actors and efforts across all three pillars. The PfRR is a good example of one of the first steps in learning exactly how to implement the Nexus approach. The plan itself appears to be quite sound. As with most first steps, though, there have been serious struggles with effective implementation. Extensive efforts were invested up-front to set up this platform and explain the process to more than 90 actors, including the local government. A group of 25 organizations from the UN, donors, and NGOs met and identified six "commitments" that approximate collective outcomes.

4.4 Implications for Peace, Security, and Development Efforts in Protracted/Conflict Settings

Based on lessons learned from the earlier discussion, the following section analyzes the specific challenges for security, development, and peace actors to operationalize the nexus approach in protracted crisis contexts.

In complex, protracted crisis scenarios, security, development, and peace aspects of the crisis occur in a non-linear, parallel fashion and influence each other. The limited set of issues that any of the actors in the Peace Security Development Nexus (PSDN) actors to deliver assistance and implement projects in such contexts can address through a project, or even a portfolio of

programs will not have an impact on solving the protracted crisis in a short time frame. Moving out of a complex, protracted crisis requires concerted, long-term, and comprehensive efforts on all three dimensions of the crisis. Yet, as outlined below, security actors face challenges when they engage too closely with development and peacebuilding efforts, which could jeopardize peacebuilding principles.

Even in the best-case scenarios, it can take several years for a state to develop adequate legal and institutional frameworks to respond to the structural causes of a large-scale, protracted peace crisis and even longer for these to have an operational effect. This delay is substantially prolonged in the absence of a consensus amongst political elites and when the roots of the crisis are linked to long-standing domestic political, social, and economic issues. In the meantime, donors traditionally fund humanitarian and development aid through short (e.g., 12 months for HRPs) and medium-term frameworks e.g., 3 or 4 years for a for a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) in support of national development plans or regional plans targeting localized crises. The disconnect between local, regional, and national-level plans, as well as between security, peace, and development plans in protracted crisis settings, is an obstacle for security, development, and peace actors to engage with national authorities on realistic, sustainable, and time-bound exit strategies. When making strategic plans and decisions, the PSDN actors need to engage lower levels of government or interim authorities to agree on realistic and localized priorities that can be reached within the planning time of a National Development Plan cycle. This effort to disaggregate national-level targets and plan based on as accurate data as possible is a logical way to make incremental progress toward a scenario in which affected populations are more self-sufficient and can rely on local government institutions to provide basic services, access to justice, and the rule of law.

In contexts where the state has retreated and/or its institutions are weakened at the local level and are no longer able to deliver basic services, PSDN actors step in. In addition, in conflict-affected contexts, the ability of development actors to deliver aid is often constrained. The desk review and case studies considered in this paper confirmed that peace principles were increasingly being infringed upon by state and non-state actors and that peacebuilding actors needed continued efforts from the UN RCO and/or donors to remind host governments of their obligations to maintain operational space and to respect the neutrality and impartiality of peacebuilding actors.

Concerning collective outcomes, the OECD, and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recommendation on the PSDN calls for a people-centered approach in which peacebuilding action, while remaining needs-based, neutral, and impartial, should strive to not harm, be conflict-sensitive, and contribute where appropriate to conditions that are suitable for taking up development efforts. Development actors often rely on more stable and predictable environments to engage (e.g., after a cease-fire or peace agreement, when the rule of law is re-established, and national legal frameworks are in place). Similarly, private sector investments needed for large-scale employment are often hard to attract in protracted crises. The commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit and captured in the Sustaining Peace resolutions show that PSDN actors cannot rely solely on continuous cycles of aid delivery. Member States and aid organizations have agreed that PSDN actors need to work on more sustainable interventions for services and infrastructure and make unstable contexts more conducive for development efforts to take place, be scaled up, and for gains not to be reversed.

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The transition from peacebuilding and recovery programming into development programming is highly context specific. The legitimacy of the state institutions is a good reference point. Elections, depending on their quality, usually mark an evolution from working around the state to working through the state because they offer some guarantee that institutions are representative of the people's interests, thus making development interventions more prominent. The danger of building institutions and doing development interventions at scale in post-conflict contexts where reconciliation and peace processes have not yielded representative political institutions presents the risk of development actors reinforcing an exclusive political system and social exclusion that marginalized groups could challenge again through violent means.

In summary, the success of peacebuilding and recovery interventions should be measured in part by determining the cost-effectiveness of service provision and in part by whether they have prevented the situation from deteriorating or made the environment more conducive for development actors to operate and the state to re-establish or strengthen its presence, capacity, and legitimacy.

The following section discusses some important recommendations.

5.1 Strategic

5.1.1 Recommendation for Host Governments to Adopt National laws to Address Protracted Crises

Governments could adopt laws dedicated to dealing with protracted security crises to distribute the resources necessary to respond sustainably to the needs of affected populations. Development actors could build states' abilities to develop legal frameworks and strengthen institutions that address crisis issues, such as re-establishing local authorities, supplying basic services, and setting up the rule of law and the judiciary. To rebuild social contracts between states and their citizens, donors and PSDN actors could ensure that the state is given credit for all program interventions unless the state is a party to the conflict, violating International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and/or International Human Rights Law (IHRL).

5.1.2 Recommendations to Promote a Common Vision and Multi-Year Programming and Associated Funding

In cases where a state is unwilling to meet the needs of its people, the international community should conduct integrated strategic security development and peace planning exercises with common needs analysis, scenario planning, and risk analysis scenarios and programming options. This exercise could involve heads of agencies, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), and ambassadors or heads of cooperation at the country level. This should lead to a common strategy with aligned security, development, and peace aid resources to support it as proper. This would promote the coherence of aid instruments on the ground and the political will of governments to address the economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security needs of their people.

An integrated financial tracking system at the country level to decide where aid flows go, who receives them, and what they are used for should be set up, including at the sub-national level. Donors could consider adopting funding mechanisms (pooled funds under the same governance structure but with multiple windows—the United Nations, NGOs, and government) at the country level to bridge the security–development–peace spectrum. These funding windows could have various levels of risk tolerance to incentivize innovative area-based approaches to delivering programs in unsafe and unregulated spaces. Transition and stabilization programming are keys to increasing the conduciveness of operating contexts for development interventions to take place.

5.1.3 Recommendations for Leadership

At the country level, host governments and donors could support and empower resident coordinators and humanitarian coordinators, as well as UNDP resident representatives, through proper funding and political support to coordinate PSDN efforts. In protracted crises, PSDN leaders (e.g., Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, (DSRSG), UN Resident Coordinator (UNRC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) as well as Country Directors) should have multi-disciplinary backgrounds that allow for a comprehensive analysis of protracted crises, an understanding of the possibilities and limitations of development assistance, as well as an evaluation of the risks of compromising the principles of security action, a strong political acumen to navigate and negotiate competing donor, national, regional, and local government interests, and the ability to muster the collective creativity of their peers and teams to work toward collective outcomes.

Leaders should articulate a simple, practical, and commonly agreed-upon vision that reflects the views and inputs of HCT and United National Country Team (UNCT) members and clearly identifies what is required to "make it work," i.e., coordinating humanitarian and development plans and programs that are distinct but are mutually reinforcing.

5.1.4 Recommendations to Safeguard Humanitarian Principles and Humanitarian Space

Donors and governments could avoid associating the PSDN approach with collective outcomes for hard peace elements, such as military peacekeeping elements linked to counterinsurgency or counterterrorism or military mission support to regional forces, and instead focus on community recovery and the extension of state authority and accountability through privileging soft peace elements.

5.1.5 Recommendations to Establish National and Local Integrated PSDN Analysis and Coordination in RCOs

National and subnational coordination mechanisms bridging the PSDN (e.g., UNCT/HCT and Peace Operation, if present) could be set up and linked with integrated analysis units (e.g., security, development, and political) housed in RCOs and staffed with senior political, development, and security analysts and officers. These integrated information management and analysis units could pull together relevant analyses produced by a range of governments, NGOs, the United Nations, international financial institutions, academic institutions, and private sector entities at the country level.

5.2 Operational

5.2.1 Recommendation to Standardize Data and Strengthen Analysis

Donors and PSDN actors could set up legal and policy frameworks for OECD DAC donors and the United Nations system to standardize data collection, analysis, and sharing methods. At the country level, analysis ability could be centralized based on comparative advantages and products shared with all PSDN actors, considering reputational and operational risks. The shared analysis in the United Nations system should be used as the basis for developing collective outcomes and PSDN policy and program strategies.

5.2.2 Recommendation for Strategic Planning and Monitoring

United Nations Strategic Plans at the country level should have collective outcome indicators to check across security, development, and peace interventions and through complementary context monitoring tools. Context monitoring could be done at the country level and checked on a quarterly basis. Thresholds for early warning could be defined and linked to pooled funds set up by the United Nations to respond to natural or manmade crises. Exit strategies need to be pegged to governance indicators and built to link up security, development, and peacebuilding interventions.

5.2.3 Recommendation to Clarify Policy Coordination and Technical Guidance on PSDN

There is a need to clarify roles and responsibilities around the PSDN in the United Nations system to know who sets policy guidelines and is designated for supplying technical guidance to United Nations presences in the country. Currently, United Nations agencies are turning to the IASC, OCHA, and/or UNDP, depending on personal connections.

5.2.4 Recommendation to Use Flexible and Pooled Funding Mechanisms to Incentivize PSDN Approaches

MPTFs and other pooled funding mechanisms should look at adopting PSDN criteria or creating dedicated PSDN funding windows, particularly at the country level, to incentivize catalytic programming through area-based approaches. Donors could also seek to avoid gaps between security and development funding streams, including through transition and recovery and flexible multi-year funding, by aligning aid strategies at the country level and by pooling resources to end protracted crises. This requires donor representations at the country level to have sufficient decision-making power to combine the different funding instruments based on integrated PSDN analyses.

5.2.5 Recommendations for Donors to Fund Common Enabling Services

In protracted crisis settings, donors could fund the common enabling support functions required for security, development, and peace actors to access affected populations throughout the area of intervention. They could incentivize PSDN actors to pool administration, support, and back-office functions to the extent possible. At a minimum, donors could use MPTFs to fund logistical support for accommodation and office infrastructure, air transportation, and safety and security services. They could also consider funding Risk.

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