

GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF UKRAINE WAR AMIDST US-WESTERN INFLUENCE

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ABSTRACT

The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 spiraled into a full-scale military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, the aftermath of Russia's Special Military Operation into the Republic of Ukraine in 2022. The conflict did not ensue as an isolated incident; it was an extension of the distrust in Russian-West European relationship that had its historical root traced to the post WW2 period. The war between the two countries has global security significance owing to its prospect of activating a new geopolitical military confrontation between Ukrainian-backed American/western aligned countries and Russia and its allies on one hand, the undermining of the essence of United Nations' existence as the global peace architect on the other hand, and the challenge of the world order as regards sovereignty legitimacy of independent countries. This work examined the extent of global implications of Russian-Ukraine prolonged conflict. The research was qualitative, deploying Conflict and Geopolitical Strategic theory as research framework. Though Russia's provocation into the war could be adduced to several reasons, some of which are historical, political and security, prime in its agenda is strategic and security concerns.

Keywords: Ukraine war, Western influence, Russia's agenda, Geopolitical and national security, Global repercussions

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Crimean annexation became a major challenge on the notion of world order. The principle of world order wherein the territorial integrity of independent countries is globally recognised has become subjective with the overturning of the principle by Russia's invasion of Ukraine which challenged its territorial legality and legitimacy. This principle has not been challenged only on Ukraine's territory, Russia has always believed in polarity system that creates balance of power, thus restricting the rights of countries perceived to be its areas of influence the right to pursue foreign relations in term of alliance with Western European and North Atlantic countries.

On the global level, Russian agenda of maintaining its regional relevance has becomes a direct challenge and rejection of the Western-led world order. Taiwo (2025) affirmed that relationship between Russia and the West has historically been characterised with suspicions (p.1058). The Russian-Ukrainian incidence thus has exhumed the Russian agenda of revisionism to the post-WWII cold war era which maps boundary between the East and West. The Russian-European restructuring this time around is raising more tensions across the continents of the world, turning the situation even more complex than the cold war period. The division between the Eastern and Western bloc has also crept into Asia to increase disruption of the world order.

There has been a great power rivalry between the WWII Western and Eastern allies after the world war victory which has led to resentment and distrust between the alliances. The end of the cold war with the dissolution of the Soviet Union was to mark a U-turn in the fractioned relationship for a mutual cooperation between them. Several attempts towards building new relationship based on mutual agreements have either been proposed or initiated by the blocs at different levels and periods.

A negotiation on accession of Russia to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) began in 1993 with General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). Russia was the largest economy in the East being a prospective member of the organization. The negotiation was hopeful as a step in bringing Europe together on economic and trade platforms. However, this process was disrupted by several factors that raised suspicion for Russian about the sincerity of the European Union and United States' commitment to the program. The bilateral agreement with Georgia which was to support Russia's membership was stifled by the request of Georgia that Russian created a legal custom post between its border and that of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Sirbiladze, I, 2019).

The U.S Jackson-Vanik Agreement deemed to have been executed on bias between members of the WTO. While this policy has not been applied or rather removed to allow some members cheap access to the organization, it has been strictly applied to considering Russian accession thus making the process unachievable. Jackson-Vanik amendment required an annual review of Russian emigration policies which is prerequisite for the U.S to grant it the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status with other former communist countries. The lack of political will from every side and Russia's unwillingness to compromise the multilateral obligations of a WTO member delayed Russia's accession to WTO as soon as could have been expected (Tarr, D. 2007). The process which lasted for eighteen years was viewed by Russia as obstacles posed by the U.S among others such as Georgia and the E.U's reservations on the conditions on which to grant WTO membership to Russia. The deed that eventually facilitated Russia membership was brokered by the Swiss in 2011.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) is another phase of Russia-E.U relations that has the potential of reviving mutual cooperation and a legal basis solid for building close relationship on wide range of issues. The PCA became unfulfilled as its implementation was halted by the E.U as a retaliation of Russia's war on Chechnya. The E.U's perceived role in instigating the Ukraine's crisis coupled with unilateral sanctions posed on Russia in the course of the crisis challenged the credibility of the relationship and the reliability of the E.U in its commitment to the deal.

It was perceived by Russia that its relations with the E.U are lopsided and not reflecting partnership based on equity or equality. Russian negotiations for integration also led to the creation of the E.U common strategy on Russia, which was initiated in 1999 and lasted till 2003, and the policy for relationship advancement between Russia and the EU for the medium time.

Common European Economic Space also was initiated in 2003 to improve Russia-E.U cooperation in the areas of security, justice, freedom, external security, research and education, and membership in the G7 which became G8 with Russia entry. The G7, which largely

cooperate on economic space, brought in Russia into relation on political space because of its lower economic status among them. The Russia-EU and Russia-Euro-Atlantic relations have always been characterized by friction as the relationship remains a charade and abstract arrangement where Russia's expectation in terms of equal treatment with them failed.

The illiberal ways of Russia that signaled their tendency of revisionism to the authoritarian style as against the Western liberality and democracy, and low economic standard of Russia compared to the E.U's created skepticism that resulted in the inconclusiveness of the E.U to understand the conditions of relation with Russia. Thus, the Russian- Euro-Atlantic arrangements only granted Russia partial integration into Euro-Atlantic institution.

Russian-Western cooperation appeared to be normative as conditions of treatment which had been expected by Russia were not satisfied. E.U and U.S has failed to consider Russia equal partner with it and also has rejected the demand of Russia to grant it special status among other former allies in Western institutions. With the failure of the programs for Russian integration into wider Europe, there has been a clear reversion to the cold war era of bipolar blocs. But this time around, it does not involve military confrontations between the multi-polar blocs. The weakness of unity in the E.U was unveiled by the Ukraine's crisis. The E.U in its reaction to the perceived Russia' military intervention in Ukraine, generally introduced various sanctions against Russia for its action in Ukraine. However, responses from members of the E.U were disparate with members defining its relationship with Russia on bilateral level drawn from consideration of their national identity and national interests.

2.0 CHALLENGE OF THE WORLD ORDER

Certain international security rules, for instance, the probability on the part of the leading global powers to unleash military intervention under the pretense of giving humanitarian protection, have been openly challenged by some world rising powers including the BRICS. The BRICS during their discourse on global governance questioned certain established rules and institutions which concentrate power in the hand of a few, while they thrust for the transnational and multilateral arrangement of the international system that ensures equity in power distribution.

The individual states of the BRICS were critical in their stance over the Libyan and Syrian crisis, emphasizing respect for national sovereignty and the need to adopt political resolution to the crisis. Russia as a member of BRICS has the opportunity to influence the disposition and attitude of the BRICS to global security issues that involved it. For instance, Russia portrayed the Syrian crisis to the BRICS as terrorism issue that has a likelihood of spilling over beyond Syria to the neighbouring enclaves; and while it was vivid that it was the direct player in Ukrainian crisis, the seemingly biased reactions of the BRICS to the crisis tends to influence the attitude of the international community towards Ukraine.

Though the BRICS originally emerged to cooperate on development and economic zones, they have attempted to extend their focus to assuming common positions on international security issues. While Russia and China are permanent members of UNSC, the other three members of the BRICS namely: Brazil, India and South Africa have also demanded reforms in the U.N that would offer them the chance of inclusion as the permanent member of the UNSC. All the

members of the BRICS have the desire to be actively involved in the international security system regardless of whichever capacity they could play the role (Moyo, J & Mosala, S., 2026). The BRICS have all been cynical about the possibility of aggrandizement on the part of the U.S and Western Europe to pursue self-interest plans of military intervention in some countries where crisis escalate. So, the BRICS in a way to guard against activities that may negate their interest expressed worry at a UNSC meeting over a resolution that condemned the Bashar Al-Assad regime's clampdown on protesters in Syria. (A. Abdenur, A. 2016).

The Ukrainian crisis created a novel platform for the BRICS to voice their common disapproval of the self-assigned superiority of the Western powers while they also have employed various means to express their unreserved commitment to reforms of the international system. Despite the E.U, U.S and NATO sanctions on Russia for violating the Ukraine's territorial integrity, the BRICS have taken a seemingly favourable side while they maintained implicit support for Russia. The group abstained from the UNGA vote where they declared their rejection of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The BRICS also criticized Julie Bishop, the Australian foreign minister's call for Russia's ban from the next G20 summit which was to take place in November 2014, as they reminded him of the equal status of the members where no member has unilateral power to determine other's positions.

The BRICS anti-Western driven efforts was also confirmed by their opposition to the Western attempts to review the international norm of the inviolability of sovereignty. They perceived the NATO-led intervention that ousted the Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 as a violation of the UNSC's resolution of 1973, which allowed intervention only on the reason to protect the civilians. Another effort was their passionate resistance to the Western powers to aid the ousting of Bashar Al-Assad, the Syrian President during the Syrian conflict.

The naivety of India and China as regards their reactions to Russian breach of non-intervention principle could be understood from the typical secessionist problems they have been battling with. India has a long history of border fragility and while they currently struggle with potential separatist movements from the Muslim population, the Marxist insurgents are on their part wreaking a strong security threat. For China, the Tibetans and Uyghurs have been a tussle for their aspiration to break away from the Han-dominated Chinese State. The dilemma of secessionism in these two nations and which appeared to be a similar situation with Russia influenced their instinct in taking a clear position that might appear critical against Russia and which may later on be used to judge their own territorial cases.

Apart from the BRICS, other fifty-four countries mostly the non-Western nations also abstained from the UNGA resolution that opposed the Crimean referendum, and another ten countries outright voting against the resolution. The BRICS and the non-Western countries' solidarity with Russia regardless of its perceived breach of international law suggested that anti-Western ploys is being strongly held; that there is lack of coherent principle that ensure unity among the global communities, and that makes it becoming extremely difficult to maintain the existing international order.

It is apparent that the Western- dominated post-cold war era has gone into extinction, yet there is no new order that currently exist to replace it. The Ukrainian crisis exposed the limit of the Western powers to bring the rising powers in line with their positions. So, the outcome of the

Ukrainian crisis is potent in shifting the status quo of the world order and weakening the U.S and West's global influence.

Three of the BRICS countries namely: Brazil, China and India are especially not comfortable with the seeming manipulation of the global institutions by the West to pursue their own narrowed interest and impose their liberal ethics. These countries see their post-war institutions which they still maintained as a means to checkmate the Western powers for using the global institutions to act against other rising powers and now Russia, irrespective of its status as UNSC permanent member. In his effort to regain its dying regional power, Vladimir Putin has garnered more supports from Syria and Iran, his Middle East allies by providing effective political protection and technical assistance while he also strived to develop deeper relations with Egypt and Jordan.

Responses from Russia and its allies to the position of the U.S and Western Europe clearly suggest a reset of the existing U.S-led security order with the aim to uphold balance of power in all regions which allows the rise of the non-Western powers to reshape the world order. Russia's ideas under the presidency of Vladimir Putin are challenging to the principle of Western policy. He has always question the integrity of the U.S and Europe in respect to international law but rather asserted that they manipulate the enactment of law to suit their interests. Interventions of the U.S and E.U in Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya are cited as evidence by Putin. Vladimir Putin also has introduced an illiberal vision of world order, to undermine the Western idea of liberal order. The illiberal idea is perceived to be more realistic for its opposition to popular empowerment, a direct opposite of western liberal ideology, and in order area supporting the national and linguistic group to influence its own sphere.

Even with the international condemnation of Russia violation of Ukrainian territory including the Western allies, many Asian countries are seeking strengthened relationship with Russia's Putin to assist in dousing tension of territorial conflict in the region. For instance, Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Prime Minister approached Russia to address its territorial conflict between Tokyo and Beijing instead of seeking intervention from international community. Likewise, South Korea sought Russia's cooperation with North Korea. The West has no influence in Asia to gain their cooperation to deal against Russia on Ukrainian issue. It should be expected that proliferating secessionist challenges in Asia would spur the region to cooperate with the West against Russia on Ukrainian conflict. In the contrary, these regions are more phobic for Western intervention as they prefer the sacredness of their sovereignty to self-determination which the West stands to protect notwithstanding the fact that some countries like India and Asia have secession and territorial problems that they are battling.

3.0 RISK OF THE UNSC LEGITIMACY

The primary responsibility of the united Nation Security Council in ensuring international peace and security is becoming gradually waned. It may not be true to adduce this shortfall only to development of events that followed the Ukraine crisis, but the crisis has greatly exposed this loophole. The crisis and scenario that followed it tend to challenge and query the legitimacy and effectiveness of UNSC in resolving international security challenges. It is not unexpected that fractionalization would always have its sway in such any organization where members have overriding narrowed interests to protect, but the division seems to be

overwhelming even between the few permanent members of the UNSC namely: the U.S, Britain, France, China and Russia. The fractionalization between the permanent members has greater effect in the resolutions of the UNSC as a result of the vetoing power they possess. In other words, any binding resolution of the UNSC must have consensual and unanimous favour of all the permanent members (UN Charter, chapter 5, article 27).

As part of its policy priorities, Russia has been seeking alliance with countries that would share its commitment in preventing the U.S global dominance which they consider as international security threat on one hand, and support for Russia's ambition of reasserting its position as a major power in a multi-polar world the other hand. This division is now creating negative impact in the legitimacy of the UNSC with several failed resolutions to settle international security matters. For instance, the UNSC potency in resolving the Ukrainian crisis has not reflected any prospect in redressing the situation.

A similar case is Syria protracted conflict where no impact of the UNSC has been felt because Syria's ally, Russia has intercepted the organization actions to intervene in the crisis. Since 2011, the UNSC resolutions on Syria have been successfully vetoed as much as eleven times by Russia (The week. Feb 22, 2018). The "Grim statistics" has shown how Russia ignored the Security Council's resolutions on Syria and the inability of the Security Council to implement its resolutions.

The chances for division in the UNSC have also been increased by China's ambivalent character and disposition to the council. Russia and China have a long relation with China as an ally who backed China during the Korean War and establishment of Peoples Republic in 1949 against the U.S-led Western alliance. The two countries being the permanent members are closer than other members and they feel connected especially against the western dominance in the Security Council. China's behaviour in the Security Council over the Ukrainian crisis is tantamount to constituting part of the obstacles to have a leeway into addressing the situation.

China has always been maintaining neutrality among the vetoing power in respect to resolutions on Ukrainian crisis. Though it has not objectively or directly justified Russia's interference on Ukrainian matter, it has neither criticized nor condemned Russia's action. China stance has created more difficulty for the UNSC for dismounting the pressures that Russia could have been subjected to.

China abstained from the votes of the UNSC which sought to declare the Crimean referendum of annexation illegal and the result invalid. It also abstained from the March 2014 UNGA vote on a resolution that declared any change in Crimea's international status unrecognized. China has not only failed to support UNSC resolution against Russia, it also described international sanctions on Russia as interference. It can be clearly felt that China neutrality suggested that, in spite of the fact that it disapproved of any violence acts, he backed Putin's action in Ukraine.

UNSC came out with four declarations in 1993, requesting the Republic of Armenia to vacate its military from the illegally occupied territories of Azerbaijan, international community made no effort to enforce compliance. There is more cohesiveness between Russia and China on the Syria crisis and Iran's nuclear weapons development than with the Western counterparts. Thus,

they may find it easy to shape the efforts of the UNSC to favour their interests especially when China has been challenging the domination of the U.S and requesting the 'rebalance of power to Asia. With divisions at the UNSC, the organisation's legitimacy and relevance in ensuring global peace and security has become disillusioned and undermined.

4.0 ESCALATIONS OF THE U.S-EUROPE'S DISINTEGRATION

The post-cold war has been characterised with efforts in rebuilding Europe and removing the line of demarcation between the cold war parties, that is, the U.S, E.U and European countries. And attempts toward new relationship which though have been repeatedly frustrated are still hoped to yield an appalling favourable result that will bring the parties together based on more mutual understanding. However, the potential reunification of European countries and the U.S has reversed to its lowest point as a result of the Ukrainian conflict and the reactions that followed from the US and EU. The upshot of the event has further been intensified even as the Western allies- the U.S and E.U are becoming more disunited over the approaches to use in handling the Ukrainian conflict considering the risk that are connected to them.

As the E.U has chosen to avert military method in curbing Russian actions in Republic of Ukraine, the U.S is making efforts to de-escalate the conflict by military confrontation against Russia. NATO supreme allied commander, General Philip Breedlove, has once berated the E.U for disagreeing with the NATO on the choice of military strategy to resolve the Ukrainian crisis, and the E.U's antagonism of the U.S growing resentment and anti-Russian strategy.

Another publication also pointed to the fact that there is growing resentment against the U.S by the E.U, growing from the U.S anti- Russian strategy with claims that the U.S is escalating situation against Russia. In November 12, 2014, General Breedlove on a visit to Bulgaria reported the escalation of Russian artillery, tanks and air defense systems and combat troop in Ukraine. The report was counterclaimed by Frank-Walter Steinneir, the German foreign minister that General Breedlove's report about the situation was not the same with the report from the European sources. The nuances in the reports from these E.U and U.S mouthpieces portend nothing short of differentiation or disparate views by allies who are meant to cooperate over the same cause. Putin has firmly defied the U.S and E.U's demand to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine. This scenario portends the collapse of the effort to reset the relationship which started at the London G20 summit.

Russia has also repeatedly adopted intervention in the F.S.U's crisis as strategy to weaken them and thus serve the neighbouring nations from relating with the U.S and Western European countries. Russian successful incursion on Ukraine despite the UNGA's resolution against its planned action, and the failure of the UNSC to contain Russian action implied the extent of division between the E.U and U.S to take effective counter-actions against its aggressors.

In spite of the fact that Russian annexation of Crimea was considered forceful, there has been no clear evidence that the world is entirely cohesive with the West. The result of the UNGA's draft resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine showed that fifty eight countries, including some E.U's member countries, abstained from the voting process, while eleven countries voted against the resolution that invalidated the changes in status of Crimean region from Ukraine to Russia (UNGA Resolution, A/RES/62/262).

While the neutral positions of the abstained countries could be averred to their diplomatic considerations to maintain a balance between Russia and U.N. in terms of relationships, the stand of the eleven countries that voted against the resolution apparently portended that, though they might not necessarily support Russia's encroachment on Ukraine's territorial integrity, they were more aligned with Russia perhaps for reasons to protect national interests. Whatsoever reasons could be adduced to the responses of the two categories of the countries in question, the result of the voting ostensibly revealed that the global communities are not equally burdened on sustaining the global unity.

It is also noteworthy that some of the countries that sided with Russia are Syria, North Korea, Cuba, China, and several African and Latin American countries abstained. The bloc did not regard the vote either as a contest between the power blocs but rather as an issue of world order. They also do not agree with the Western Europe parading themselves as the guardian of liberal order. Many countries that are committed to the Eastern policy- Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Czech republic and Hungary even has remained divided on Ukraine's issue and on long term issue that will determine E.U's policy. The circumstances that followed the Ukrainian crisis revealed the fragility of unity and lack of leadership among the global actors in the international communities. Failure of the UNSC to resolve Ukraine's crisis seemed to have increased the challenge on the legitimacy of the institution.

This was reflected on the Syrian crisis with increasing tensions which continued for years because of overriding interest between the US and Russia, the permanent members of the UNSC that should vanguard actions to resolve the war. The E.U and U.S focus has been shifted from the Syrian crisis with the surge of the Ukrainian crisis which seemed to take priority. As Syrian crisis escalates continually and Syrian opposition called for international support, the EU and U.S remained indifferent to Syria as all attentions were focused on Ukraine.

Another important source of division among the E.U countries is the matter of relationship with Russia where choices are divergent. Some old members of the E.U that established economic relation with Russia are guided by economic leverage they benefit from long-term energy supplies and normalizing relations with Russia. The new members are otherwise more interested in tackling Russian domination of the CIS states.

The UNSC ability to ensure global peace and security basically depends upon the narrow interest of its members. Any military intervention in international conflict will only be legal in accordance with the principle of the U.N rules and regulations, otherwise it would be considered as interference. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia has intercepted the UNSC resolutions for intervention on Crimea and Syrian issue thereby reducing the U.N to normative institution.

Russia vetoed the resolution to investigate the chemical weapon attack in Syria though Vladimir Putin had earlier suggested such inquiring to be made. Russia was reasonably not against the inquiry but intentionally later went against it to frustrate U.S who has given a backing to the resolution. The paralysis of the UNSC had a precedent in Afghan war in the beginning of 1979 due to the stand-off between the S.U and the West, as Russian, Pakistan and Uzbekistan supported armed Afghan military movements.

Inability to pursue a coherent policy by the UNSC has been underscored by power competition between Russia and U.S. as the overriding interests of the two members have been determining the effectiveness of the principle of the organization. With the frozen relationship among the UNSC as a result of the Ukrainian conflict, Russia has been more active and expanding its role in the Middle East, such as in the case of Syria where it intervened in Syrian war in 2015 to defeat the Islamic state and re-stabilize Bashar Al-Assad regime, at least to an extent. Russia was also trying to improve relationship with Afghanistan on business investment proposal, diplomatic propaganda, cultural program, financial and military support for the center, and so, in 2014 it re-opened a cultural center in Kabul.

The Russian efforts have been to protect its image as protector of its allies and to undermine the E.U and U.S impacts in the regions of its influences.

5.0 RISK OF FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES

The outcomes of the Ukrainian conflict have increased the tendency of redrawing the European map as the international territorial boundary especially in Eastern Europe has become so fragile.

To start with, the Ukraine's territorial sovereignty has become subjective and the internationally recognised geographical status of Ukraine has become undefined as a corollary of the Crimean annexation. It has been observed that Russia national interest has been deeply injected in many of the republics and provinces that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. This rhetoric reappeared following the dissolution of the USSR as ethno-political and territorial disputes ensued and stirring fragmentation of borders especially among the F.S.U. Cases in example are territorial destabilization in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia declaration of independence from Georgia in 2008 were not internationally recognised. But Russia and its few alliances such as Nicaragua, Nauru and Venezuela were keyed into Russia's biddings to recognize the independence of the regions. While it was very clear that the two countries were not viable to become sovereign nations in all reality especially for their economic survival which are dependent on Russia, Russia used the events as an opportunity to occupy the two separatist countries under the auspices of protection, and turning them to puppet regions.

This situation was similar to Moldova, a former socialist republic of the Soviet Union. Transnistria is only, a tiny republic of about 4, 163sq. km with Russian, Ukrainian, Moldova and Romania forming the largest portion of its population. The country, typical of the Georgian case became independent from the S.U with a Transnistrian region being internationally recognized as part of the Moldovan territorial integrity. The region is presently another de facto independent nation which emerged in 2006 largely through the military support provided by the Russian Army.

The Moldovan border was destabilised by Russian due to its national interest and skepticism in averting Moldova nationalism and their tendency of reunifying with Romania being a territory that falls westward. Russia used the growing population of Russian speakers especially the Russian and Ukrainian, and 1989 constitution which adopted Moldovan compulsorily as

the Moldovan official language as (BBC News, 26 Dec. 201) a good excuse to justify its intervention in Moldovan as a protective policy.

In this light, the Transnistria region having proclaimed its secession in September 1, 1990 confirmed its independence in 2006. However, the republic remains unrecognized by the many countries including Russia. It should however be clearly noted that Russia's goal of fragmenting the region to achieve its own national interest was achieved. Of the most recent territorial fragmentation is the perceived forceful separation of the formerly Crimean autonomous region of Ukraine Republic and integration into Russian federation.

Composition of Republic of Ukraine, which is internationally recognised as a sovereign state included the Crimean autonomous province. After the annexation by Russia in 2014, Ukrainian territorial integrity has become a major international issue that remains unresolved. As it is today, Ukraine may retain its territorial status as it was before the Crimean annexation but the reality showed that its geographical coverage as represented on the world map is a mere façade due to territorial split (either legal or illegal) that severed Crimea from Ukraine. Territorial fragmentation has become major barriers for effective functioning of the global institutions in global affairs and stability of territorial sovereignty.

More results of territorial fragmentation are likely to be experienced in F.S.U republics where the ethnic Russians and Russian language speakers constitute a part of the population of the countries where Russian wield influences. There is tendency for Ukraine border to be more scattered especially in the Eastern part which is known as the Donbas region comprising of Donetsk and Luhansk autonomous regions.

These regions are Ukraine's pro-Russian rebel regions that broke away from Ukrainian central rule in the aftermath of the 2014 protest that toppled the pro-Russian Ukraine's president, Victor Yanukovich. Donetsk and Luhansk were divergent on the anti-government protest that force out the former president of power in February 2014 only to be replaced with the pro-western government.

Separation grew in the Donbas region that both the Donetsk and Luhansk regions jointly declared their goal to form a confederative union of People's Republics to be known as Novorisiya (New Russia), and a treaty to unify under the name was signed in May 24, 2014. The decision was a project to establish a union state with Russia though, Oleg Tsarev, the speaker of the joint parliament of the two separatist regions (Donetsk and Luhansk) announced the termination of Novorissiya project on 20 May, 2015.

Severally, circumstances that surround Ukraine's government after the Russian annexation of Crimea are signaling further destabilization of the country. The vocal minority in Donetsk have supported breaking away from Ukraine's government and joining with Russia whose borders are close to their enclaves. On 28 May, 2014, Luhansk President, Valery Bolstov also disclosed that the Luhansk People's Republic would start introducing its own legislation based on Russian law and denouncing the suitability of Ukrainian law due to it being written for oligarchs.

Luhansk was self-proclaimed independent republic but only recognized by the Donetsk People's Republic and South Ossetia. The break-away region of Ukraine also has started

instilling in their population a sense of nationhood. The so-called republic has drawn up the new republic's constitution, designed new school curriculum in Russian language, and the students are taught civic education that would stir up in them patriotic thinking towards their newly declared republic hopeful to be soon internationally recognized.

The separatist have claimed that the vast majority of the Donbas region who participated in the May 11, 2014 referendum favoured the emergence of the People's Republic. Though the result of referenda in Donetsk and Luhansk were not officially recognized by Ukrainian government, US, EU and most of the notable Western European countries, the separatists have been asserting governmental authority over the region.

Russia has publicly created the impression of no-interest in the activities of the separatists' movement in Donbas, but its underground influence was undoubted. In Moldova, the Gagauz constitutes a significant threat to territorial stability of the Republic of Moldova. The Gagauz is the autonomous region in the southern part of Moldova. Their dual identity, being ethnically Turkic and religiously Russian (Houben, C. 2017, 23), forms the basis for separation tendency in Moldova. Turkey and Russia compete for influence over this region but the People are more loyal to Russia.

Opposition of the Gagauz in Moldova to Moldova's relation with the E.U or West raised the likelihood of their separation from Moldova. So, out of the fear that with the dissolution of the USSR, the Moldova integration with West would erode the Soviet legacies in them, the Gagauz attempted to declare its independence from Moldova in 1990 just at the same period that Moldova declared its independence from the S.U. A referendum was also held in Moldova's Gagauzia region in February 2014 to decide on Moldova relationship between the European Union and Russian-led Custom Union. The Gagauz overwhelmingly voted in support of Moldovan integration with the Russian-led Custom Union instead of the E.U. As Moldova has not taken a decisive position on its foreign relationship, the Gagauz has chosen to maintain its autonomous status as a constituent region of Moldova in as much as Moldova agreed on, at least, neutrality between Russia and the E.U. if it refuses to join the C.U.

This position clearly appears as an advantage for Russia to use as a tool to fuel separatism in Gagauz region of Moldova under the auspices of protection of its minority groups and to encourage establishment of a new republic should Moldova engage formal association with the west.

Adjara is an autonomous region, a politically divided republic of Georgian populated by Georgians, Russians, Armenians and the Ajars. Unlike the other two regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Adjara has not been experiencing any major ethnic unrest since the collapse of the S.U. The region has a local self-rule which makes the post- independence relation between Georgian and the region still undefined. Adjara rather maintains close relationship with Russia immediately after S.U. dissolution till 2004 under the then president Aslan Abashidze.

Though the region has a strong Georgian identity, it is a Muslim-dominated autonomous region that is ingrained with the sense that their regional laws should be given primacy over the national laws, and so, the Georgian government has been reluctant in amalgamating them into national government structure in order to avert separatism. Though the extent of Adjara local

self-rule is being regulated since 2003 rose revolution, the region still remains a potential break-away region due to its status of being a recognized regional government that has local authorities within Georgian republic. The population of the region with its largest minority being Russia, Armenia, Abkhaz and others who are pro-Russian, stand as an advantage for Russia to drive separatism sentiments in the region as a strategy of monitoring the political atmosphere in Georgia as a way to further fracture its territorial integrity typical of the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

There are possibilities that Russia might be attempting to support groups that are belligerent to Georgia government to join in the membership of the Russian-Belarusian Union. Russia has limitless tactics in routing separatism especially in places like Adjara where Russian world like Armenia, Abkhazia and Russia became a pretext to launch military intervention when deemed (Green, W. 2009, par 4.)

The fractures of territorial integrity which has the potentiality of spilling over to other regions especially in Europe are clear indicators of the extent of territorial fragmentation and geographical instability the world may begin to experience. Already, with several proto-states, partially and/or non-recognized de facto states that are existing, the reality of territorial definition as reflected on the world map has become disputable.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Ukraine crisis triggered the impulse among some rising powers to challenge the Euro-Atlantic dominated world order which they perceived as marginalizing and relegating their global relevance. The crisis has blown the factionalism between the UNSC who represents the global security apparatus and thus posing a greater risk on their legitimacy to guarantee global peace and security. Efforts in rebuilding mutual relationship between the cold war parties became fractured with the division between the international communities and European countries over the Ukraine crisis and which have increased the tendency of fragmentation of international territorial boundaries.

The circumstances that Crimean incident exhumed are latent in bringing back the cold war era of undefined relationship between the Eastern and Western Europe. With the growing alliances among the BRICS countries and between Russia and some Middle East developing nuclear powers that are anti-Western, the impending rivalry may be more gruesome to the extent of partitioning Europe from bipolar to multi-polar structure. It is however more strategic for the Western and the Eastern Europe to dispel the ideas of rivalry for power superiority such as the case was in the post-World War II but to depolarize the two continents into one alliance infused with practical sense of cooperation to secure global peace and security.

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