RAMSEY’S 1926 CLAIM, “…THAT THERE DO NOT SEEM TO BE ANY SUCH THINGS AS THE RELATIONS HE (AUTHOR’S NOTE-KEYNES) DESCRIBES…”, IS FALSE1: IT VITIATES RAMSEY’S ENTIRE CRITIQUE OF KEYNES

Author: Michael Emmett Brady

ABSTRACT

Ramsey made many,many, many errors about Keynes’s logical theory of probability, as contained in A Treatise on Probability,in his reciews of 922 and 1926.Given the extent and magnitude of these errors, I have decided to focus on the most severe of these many, many, many errors

The most severe error is Ramsey’s complete confusion and conflation of Keynes’s Boolean ,objective ,logical, probability relations with the metaphysical relations of Plato, as well as Moore’s use of Plato’s metaphysical relations or entities to serve as the foundation for his intuitionistic approach in analyzing moral and ethical issues, especially as it relates to Moore’s concern for “the Good”.

Now it is a correct conclusion that, as regards issues in ethics, morality, aesthetics and metaphysics that Keynes, despite some criticisms, did accept Moore’s intuitionistic approach in those specific fields. However, to claim that Keynes’s work on probability and statistics is based on a foundation of Platonic relations /Moorean intuitionism, with assorted metaphysical entities supposedly floating around somewhere in outer space, waiting to be intuited, is simply preposterous and ludicrous lunacy.

Keynes’s logical theory of probability, in his A Treatise on Probability, is based wholly on a foundation of the formal, mathematical, symbolic logic that was originally presented in G. Boole’s The Laws of Thought (1854). Keynes’s method was Boole’s method. Boole’s method was composed of (a) a relational, propositional, formal, mathematical, symbolic logic, (b) an interval valued probability approach, (c) required the general rejection of the POI, and (d) required a logical, objective probability relation holding between RELATED propositions, not Ramsey’s idiotic, imbecilic and moronic claims based on an analysis of UNRELATED propositions.

Keywords: Boole’s objective, logical, probability relation, imprecise probability, interval valued probability, non-numerical probability, approximation, inexact measurement, Boole’s relational propositional logic, Keynes, logical theory of probability, A Treatise on Probability

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